2012
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2079146
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In Broad Daylight: Full Information and Higher-order Punishment Opportunities Promote Cooperation

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 1 publication
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“…Kamei & Putterman, 2013), cost/benefit ratio(Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008), or probability of sanction (e.g.,Dai et al 2014), could potentially yield different results.9 Ostrom's (19909 Ostrom's ( , 2010a Design Principles allude to the connection somewhat, with both participation and enforcement appearing as beneficial factors, but the connection is not fully developed (e.g.,Ostrom, 2000Ostrom, , 2010b.10 For example, used graduated sanctions; Vollan (2008) used rewards and punishments; Vyrastekovia andvan Soest (2003),Mulder et al (2005),Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) used weak versus strong punishments; and some used centralized enforcement (e.g.,Vyrastekovia & van Soest, 2003), whereas others used self-enforcement (e.g.,, or both (e.g.,Tyran & Feld, 2006).https://doi.org/10.1017/S1930297500006975 Published online by Cambridge University Press…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Kamei & Putterman, 2013), cost/benefit ratio(Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008), or probability of sanction (e.g.,Dai et al 2014), could potentially yield different results.9 Ostrom's (19909 Ostrom's ( , 2010a Design Principles allude to the connection somewhat, with both participation and enforcement appearing as beneficial factors, but the connection is not fully developed (e.g.,Ostrom, 2000Ostrom, , 2010b.10 For example, used graduated sanctions; Vollan (2008) used rewards and punishments; Vyrastekovia andvan Soest (2003),Mulder et al (2005),Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) used weak versus strong punishments; and some used centralized enforcement (e.g.,Vyrastekovia & van Soest, 2003), whereas others used self-enforcement (e.g.,, or both (e.g.,Tyran & Feld, 2006).https://doi.org/10.1017/S1930297500006975 Published online by Cambridge University Press…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%