In Broad Daylight: Full Information and Higher-order Punishment Opportunities Promote Cooperation

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Abstract:The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are competing claims about whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment (punishing punishment or failure to punish) help or undermine cooperation in social dilemmas. In a set of experimental treatments, we find that availability of higherorder punishment increases cooperation and efficiency when subjects have full information on the pattern of punishing, including its past history, and opportunities to punish are unrestricted. Availability of higher-order punishment reduces cooperation and efficiency if it is restricted to counter-punishing alone, if past history is unavailable, and if there is a dedicated counter-punishment stage.Keywords: collective action, social dilemma, voluntary contribution, public goods, punishment, counter-punishment, higher-order punishment. JEL classification codes: C9, H41, D0 2Research Highlight: We conduct voluntary contribution experiments with opportunities to punish both conditional on others' contributions and conditional on others' punishments. We find that higher-order punishing opportunities increase cooperation and earnings when subjects learn of all punishments, are shown histories of past decisions, and can engage in higher-order punishment of any group member. We find that higher-order punishing opportunities reduce cooperation and earnings when subjects learn only who punished them (ego-centric information), see no history of past decisions, and higher-order punishment is limited to counter-punishing. Concern that knowing who punished whom and having opportunities to retaliate will undermine voluntary collective action is found to be unwarranted under conditions of symmetric information and punishment opportunities.3

Synergistic effects of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource dilemma

“…Kamei & Putterman, 2013), cost/benefit ratio(Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008), or probability of sanction (e.g.,Dai et al 2014), could potentially yield different results.9 Ostrom's (19909 Ostrom's ( , 2010a Design Principles allude to the connection somewhat, with both participation and enforcement appearing as beneficial factors, but the connection is not fully developed (e.g.,Ostrom, 2000Ostrom, , 2010b.10 For example, used graduated sanctions; Vollan (2008) used rewards and punishments; Vyrastekovia andvan Soest (2003),Mulder et al (2005),Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) used weak versus strong punishments; and some used centralized enforcement (e.g.,Vyrastekovia & van Soest, 2003), whereas others used self-enforcement (e.g.,, or both (e.g.,Tyran & Feld, 2006).https://doi.org/10.1017/S1930297500006975 Published online by Cambridge University Press…”