Synergistic effects of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource dilemma

Abstract

We used psychological methods to investigate how two prominent interventions, participatory decision making and enforcement, influence voluntary cooperation in a common-pool resource dilemma. Groups (N=40) harvested resources from a shared resource pool. Individuals in the Voted-Enforce condition voted on conservation rules and could use economic sanctions to enforce them. In other conditions, individuals could not vote (Imposed-Enforce condition), lacked enforcement (Voted condition), or both (Imposed condition). Cooperation was strongest in the Voted-Enforce condition (Phase 2). Moreover, these groups continued to cooperate voluntarily after enforcement was removed later in the experiment. Cooperation was weakest in the Imposed-Enforce condition and degraded after enforcement ceased. Thus, enforcement improved voluntary cooperation only when individuals voted. Perceptions of procedural justice, self-determination, and security were highest in the Voted-Enforced condition. These factors (legitimacy, security) increased voluntary cooperation by promoting rule acceptance and internalized motivation. Voted-Enforce participants also felt closer to one another (i.e., self-other merging), further contributing to their cooperation. Neither voting nor enforcement produced these sustained psychological conditions alone. Voting lacked security without enforcement (Voted condition), so the individuals who disliked the rule (i.e., the losing voters) pillaged the resource. Enforcement lacked legitimacy without voting (Imposed-Enforce condition), so it crowded out internal reasons for cooperation. Governance interventions should carefully promote security without stifling fundamental needs (e.g., procedural justice) or undermining internal motives for cooperation.

Understanding the Effects of Social Value Orientations in Shaping Regulatory Outcomes through Agent-Based Modeling: An Application in Organic Farming

“…Such individuals are described as having intrinsic or internalized motivations (DeCaro, 2019). e characterization we assign to prosocial actors accords with existing research on cooperation in natural resource management, which shows that sustained cooperation by resource users is greater in cases where individuals have the opportunity to participate in the selection of governing rules that are subsequently enforced (DeCaro et al, 2015). Insofar as voluntary participation in a regulatory program can be treated as a proxy for "voting" to be governed by a set of rules, our expectation that prosocial actors will remain in compliance is consistent with this previous work by DeCaro et al…”

Cooperation through collective punishment and participation

“…Still, mixed evidence exists whether voting on the sanctioning authority could be an example of such beneficial participation. DeCaro et al (2015) find that the ability to vote on rules improves cooperation but only if enforcement of compliance is certain, Chang et al (2018) add that enforcement through an elected authority is often undermined by, for example, political inequality across individual actors, and Heap et al (2020) find that including individuals in collective decisions through giving "voice" increases cooperation more than through participation in form of a vote. Baldwin (2013Baldwin ( , 2019 even show that local decision-makers with centralized authority to punish, i.e., chiefs, are better suited to ensure compliance and cooperation than officials elected to representative legislatures.…”

The effect of commitment in the public goods game with endogenous institution formation

“…For example, since the members are voluntary participants, they accept its rule as having been produced through a just procedure. Therefore, the members feel that the rules are fair, which facilitates their cooperation with the institution (DeCaro et al., 2015). Furthermore, endogenous participation in an institution can prevent the crowding‐out effect (for a review, see Dannenberg & Gallier, 2020), which refers to the potential of extrinsic incentives like punishment to undermine agents’ intrinsic motivations (Reeson & Tisdell, 2008).…”