Scientific representation: against similarity and isomorphism

Suárez, Mauricio

doi:10.1080/0269859032000169442

Cited by 254 publications

(122 citation statements)

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“…Both approaches face serious challenges (Suárez, 2003;Frigg, 2006). And accounts of scientific representation that diverge from the copy making accounts have emerged as attractive alternatives (Hughes, 1997;Suárez, 2004;Contessa, 2007;Frigg, 2010).…”

Section: Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scientific Representation and Theoretical Equivalence

Nguyen¹

2017

Philos. of Sci.

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In this paper I connect two debates in the philosophy of science; the questions of scientific representation and both model and theoretical equivalence. I argue that by paying attention to how a model is used to draw inferences about its target system, we can define a notion of theoretical equivalence that turns on whether their models licence the same claims about the same target systems. I briefly consider the implications of this for two questions that have recently been discussed in the context of the formal philosophy of science.

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Section: Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scientific Representation and Theoretical Equivalence

Nguyen¹

2017

Philos. of Sci.

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“…See Giere (2004), pp. 747-748, for an explicit rejection of any such thesis, including his endorsement (p. 747, n. 8) of Suárez's (2003) arguments for such a rejection. See also my n. 22, above.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Missing systems and the face value practice

Thomson-Jones

2009

Synthese

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“…A hydraulic line diagram is a vehicle which in part expresses the massflow model's content. An abstract view of models claims that a model's content is exhausted by structural or relational features (see, e.g., Giere 1988;Suarez 2003;Weisberg 2013). 2 in effect, a model says only mathematical things.…”

Section: Fictionalism About Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Models-as-Fictions to Models-as-Tools

Currie¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Many accounts of scientific modeling conceive of models as fictions: there are analogies between models and various aesthetic objects, as well as between how scientists interact with models and how authors interact with fictions. Fictionalists, like most accounts of models, take models to be revelatory of the actual world in virtue of bearing some resemblance relation to a target system. While such fictionalist accounts capture crucial aspects of modelling practice, they are ill-suited to some design and engineering contexts. Here, models sometimes serve to underwrite design projects whereby real-world targets are constructed. in such circumstances, it is unclear what the model is supposed to resemble. Further, while fictionalists often require that models qua models have their content in virtue of construal or interpretation, in some engineering and design contexts success-conditions do not require such content-all that is required is that the model generates the required outputs. i take these points to motivate a view which accommodates fictionalism, but is broader. i articulate and defend an account of models as tools: specifically, material objects which are put to particular uses in particular contexts.

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Scientific representation: against similarity and isomorphism

Cited by 254 publications

References 0 publications

Scientific Representation and Theoretical Equivalence

Scientific Representation and Theoretical Equivalence

Missing systems and the face value practice

From Models-as-Fictions to Models-as-Tools

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