Missing systems and the face value practice

Thomson-Jones, Martin

doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9507-y

Cited by 60 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Often fictionalists are motivated by deflationism about the metaphysical question: insofar as they can, they try to minimize the metaphysical commitments required by their view. Prima facie, stipulating fictional possibilia brings metaphysical costs, which fictionalists typically seek to avoid (Levy 2012;Thomson-Jones 2010;Toon 2012).…”

Section: Three Questions About Theoretical Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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From Models-as-Fictions to Models-as-Tools

Currie¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Many accounts of scientific modeling conceive of models as fictions: there are analogies between models and various aesthetic objects, as well as between how scientists interact with models and how authors interact with fictions. Fictionalists, like most accounts of models, take models to be revelatory of the actual world in virtue of bearing some resemblance relation to a target system. While such fictionalist accounts capture crucial aspects of modelling practice, they are ill-suited to some design and engineering contexts. Here, models sometimes serve to underwrite design projects whereby real-world targets are constructed. in such circumstances, it is unclear what the model is supposed to resemble. Further, while fictionalists often require that models qua models have their content in virtue of construal or interpretation, in some engineering and design contexts success-conditions do not require such content-all that is required is that the model generates the required outputs. i take these points to motivate a view which accommodates fictionalism, but is broader. i articulate and defend an account of models as tools: specifically, material objects which are put to particular uses in particular contexts.

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Section: Three Questions About Theoretical Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A further motivation is the 'face value practice' (Thomson-Jones 2010) of modeling: undoubt-2. The term 'abstract' is notoriously difficult (Lewis 1986) except where noted i will take an abstract entity to be one which only possesses structural properties (Levy 2015;Thomson-Jones 2010).…”

Section: Fictionalism About Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Models-as-Fictions to Models-as-Tools

Currie¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…The problem for any account of representation which requires that models instantiate properties is that it is remains unclear what that means for non-physical objects. Thomson-Jones (2010) points out that such objects, in virtue of their abstractness, cannot instantiate the kind of properties one would like to impute to real systems. Abstract objects neither have mass; nor do they oscillate.…”

Section: Envoimentioning

confidence: 99%

The turn of the valve: representing with material models

Frigg¹,

Nguyen

2017

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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Many scientific models are representations. Building on Goodman and Elgin's notion of representation-as we analyse what this claim involves by providing a general definition of what makes something a scientific model and formulating a novel account of how models represent. We call the result the DEKI account of representation, which offers a complex kind of representation involving an interplay of denotation, exemplification, keying up of properties, and imputation. Throughout we focus on material models, and we illustrate our claims with the Phillips-Newlyn machine. In the conclusion we suggest that, mutatis mutandis, the DEKI account can be carried over to other kinds of models, notably fictional and mathematical models.

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“…5 Thomson-Jones (2010). 6 The suggestion that models might be understood as fictional entities is found in Godfrey-Smith (2006) and Frigg (2006).…”

Section: Walton's Theory: Props and Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But then how can such objects possess the spatiotemporal properties we 3 Thomson-Jones (2010). 4 For example, see Giere (1988Giere ( , 1999Giere ( , 2004 appear to attribute to them, such as oscillating with period T?…”

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confidence: 99%

The ontology of theoretical modelling: models as make-believe

Toon

2009

Synthese

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The descriptions and theoretical laws scientists write down when they model a system are often false of any real system. And yet we commonly talk as if there were objects that satisfy the scientists' assumptions and as if we may learn about their properties. Many attempt to make sense of this by taking the scientists' descriptions and theoretical laws to define abstract or fictional entities. In this paper, I propose an alternative account of theoretical modelling that draws upon Kendall Walton's 'make-believe' theory of representation in art. I argue that this account allows us to understand theoretical modelling without positing any object of which scientists' modelling assumptions are true.

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Missing systems and the face value practice

Cited by 60 publications

References 20 publications

From Models-as-Fictions to Models-as-Tools

From Models-as-Fictions to Models-as-Tools

The turn of the valve: representing with material models

The ontology of theoretical modelling: models as make-believe

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