Scientific realism: quo vadis? Introduction: new thinking about scientific realism

Psillos, Stathis; Ruttkamp-Bloem, Emma

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1493-x

Cited by 5 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…According to this view, theories cannot be true or false as they are only instruments for predictions and explanations. While scientific realists claim that predictively successful theories are (approximately) true and unobservable entities postulated by them (like atoms or electrons) really exist (Psillos, 1999), instrumentalists maintain that truth cannot be discovered and proved by scientists and we have no good reason to accept the truth of successful theories, as well as the very possibility of believing in what theory tells us about unobservables. Science, according to antirealists, only aims at giving us empirically adequate theories and by accepting these theories we only accept their empirical adequacy and predictive power (this line of reasoning is most developed in van Fraassen's (1980) writings on constructive empiricism).…”

Section: Instrumentalist View On Organizational Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the same time, this perspective takes away questions and issues of ontological and epistemological incommensurability as these problems simply do not exist and are not applicable to instruments and tools, which organizational theories from now on are. Ontological and epistemological paradigms assume that there must be truth, which theories should ascertain (Psillos, 1999;Psillos and Ruttkamp-Bloem, 2017) and this is impossible task as far as there are different views on reality and ways of getting knowledge about this reality. Obviously, two theories holding radically different and incommensurable view on the nature of reality and knowledge cannot both be true; at least one of them is false and we cannot know right now which one is.…”

Section: Instrumentalist View On Organizational Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Can institutional theory be refuted, replaced or modified?

Aksom

Zhylinska

Гайдай

2020

IJOA

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Purpose This paper aims to demonstrating that the former new institutional theory of isomorphism and decoupling cannot be extended, modified or refuted as it is a closed theory. By analyzing the structure of this former version of institutional theory and its numerous modern competitors (institutional entrepreneurship, institutional work and institutional logics theories) it is argued that these alternative theories demonstrate even less explanatory and predictive power and do not refute or extend their predecessor. The rise of new organizational theories can have no other effect on classic institutional theory than to limit the domain of its applicability. In turn, there are a number of principles and conditions that future theories should meet to be accepted as progressive advancements. Design/methodology/approach The paper provides a review of relevant organizational and philosophical literature on theory construction and scientific progress in organizational research and offers a set of principles and demands for those new theories that seek to challenge new institutionalism. Findings The authors show that the former institutional theory satisfies two main criteria that any scientific theory should conform with following it is useful and falsifiable in term of giving explanations and predictions while, at the same time, clearly specifying what can be observed and what cannot; what can happen and what is not likely to occur. Modern institutional theories cannot demonstrate this quality and they do not satisfy these criteria. Moreover, institutional isomorphism theory is a closed theory, which means it cannot be intervened with changes and modifications and all future theories should develop their theoretical propositions for other domains of applications while they should account for all empirical phenomena that institutional theory successfully explains. Originality/value Adopting instrumental view on organizational theories allowed reconstructing the logic and trajectory of organizational research evolution and defends its rationality and progressive nature. It is also outlined how existing dominant theory should be treated and how new theories should challenge its limitations and blind spots and which philosophical and methodological criteria should be met.

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Section: Instrumentalist View On Organizational Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Instrumentalist View On Organizational Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can institutional theory be refuted, replaced or modified?

Aksom

Zhylinska

Гайдай

2020

IJOA

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…So, the entities posited by them, or, at any rate, entities very similar to those posited, do inhabit the world (Psillos 1999 , p. xvii). 3 As Stathis Psillos and Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem ( 2017 ) point out, parties to the scientific realism/antirealism debate in contemporary philosophy of science generally agree “that scientific realism has three dimensions (Psillos 1999 ) or stances (Chakravartty 2007 ); a metaphysical, semantic, and an epistemic dimension.”…”

Section: The Three Dimensions Of Scientific Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Before we begin our survey of key positions and arguments in the scientific realism/antirealism debate in contemporary philosophy of science, it is important to note that the focus of this book is the contemporary debate. As Psillos and Ruttkamp-Bloem ( 2017 , p. 3190) observe, while scientific realism used to include at least three theses: “Theoretical terms refer to unobservable entities; … theories are (approximately) true; and … there is referential continuity in theory change,” contemporary scientific realists tend to be more selective about the content of scientific theories that they identify as worthy of belief (see also Psillos 2018 ) . That is to say, the scientific realism/antirealism debate used to be dominated by discussions of the notion of convergence on the truth, that is, that “mature theories are converging on the truth because they all are referring to the same things” (Laymon 1984 , p. 121, cf.…”

Section: The Three Dimensions Of Scientific Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Realism Versus Antirealism in Contemporary Philosophy of Science

Mizrahi

2020

Synthese Library

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The scientific realism/antirealism debate in contemporary philosophy of science is about theoretical knowledge, that is, knowledge that is supposed to be about so-called “unobservables.” This includes theoretical entities, such as neutrinos and genes, as well as theoretical processes, such as natural selection and continental drift. Is theoretical knowledge in science possible? In general, scientific realists tend to think that science can (and does) yield theoretical knowledge, whereas antirealists tend to think that science cannot (and does not) yield theoretical knowledge (that is, knowledge about unobservables). To put it another way, scientific realists tend to argue that we have good reasons to believe that our best scientific theories are approximately true because, if they were not even approximately true, they would not be able to explain and predict natural phenomena with such impressive accuracy. On the other hand, antirealists tend to argue that the impressive success of our best scientific theories does not warrant belief in the approximate truth of our best scientific theories. This is because the history of science is a graveyard of theories that were once successful but were later discarded.

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“…9] [48,49][50, ch. 2] [51]. The phrase mind-independent reality, or simply independent reality, indicates a reality which exists other than only in human thought.…”

Section: Moderate Realism: Physics Might Be Able To Describe Independmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding quantum mechanics: a review and synthesis in precise language

Drummond¹

2019

Open Physics

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This review, of the understanding of quantum mechanics, is broad in scope, and aims to reflect enough of the literature to be representative of the current state of the subject. To enhance clarity, the main findings are presented in the form of a coherent synthesis of the reviewed sources. The review highlights core characteristics of quantum mechanics. One is statistical balance in the collective response of an ensemble of identically prepared systems, to differing measurement types. Another is that states are mathematical terms prescribing probability aspects of future events, relating to an ensemble of systems, in various situations. These characteristics then yield helpful insights on entanglement, measurement, and widely-discussed experiments and analyses. The review concludes by considering how these insights are supported, illustrated and developed by some specific approaches to understanding quantum mechanics. The review uses non-mathematical language precisely (terms defined) and rigorously (consistent meanings), and uses only such language. A theory more descriptive of independent reality than is quantum mechanics may yet be possible. One step in the pursuit of such a theory is to reach greater consensus on how to understand quantum mechanics. This review aims to contribute to achieving that greater consensus, and so to that pursuit.

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Scientific realism: quo vadis? Introduction: new thinking about scientific realism

Cited by 5 publications

References 34 publications

Can institutional theory be refuted, replaced or modified?

Can institutional theory be refuted, replaced or modified?

Realism Versus Antirealism in Contemporary Philosophy of Science

Understanding quantum mechanics: a review and synthesis in precise language

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