Scientific progress: Knowledge versus understanding

Dellsén, Finnur

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2016.01.003

Cited by 72 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…by adopting a knowledge-first framework that denies the need to analyse knowledge in terms of belief (see, e.g. Bird 2010a); thinking that one can know on the basis of acceptance (for discussion see Wray 2001Wray , 2007Tebben 2019); or understand without belief (see Dellsén 2017)). However, this is no trouble for my argument here unless doubting these orthodoxies can yield a positive argument for attributing collective knowledge or understanding in Controversy.…”

Section: Controversymentioning

confidence: 99%

How Intellectual Communities Progress

Ross

2020

Episteme

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Recent work takes both philosophical and scientific progress to consist in acquiring factive epistemic states such as knowledge. However, much of this work leaves unclear what entity is the subject of these epistemic states. Furthermore, by focusing only on states like knowledge, we overlook progress in intermediate cases between ignorance and knowledge-for example, many now celebrated theories were initially so controversial that they were not known. This paper develops an improved framework for thinking about intellectual progress. Firstly, I argue that we should think of progress relative to the epistemic position of an intellectual community rather than individual inquirers. Secondly, I show how focusing on the extended process of inquiry (rather than the mere presence or absence of states like knowledge) provides a better evaluation of different types of progress. This includes progress through formulating worthwhile questions, acquiring new evidence, and increasing credence on the right answers to these questions. I close by considering the ramifications for philosophical progress, suggesting that my account supports rejecting the most negative views while allowing us to articulate different varieties of optimism and pessimism.

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Section: Controversymentioning

confidence: 99%

How Intellectual Communities Progress

Ross

2020

Episteme

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“…Similarly, Cevolani and Tombolo (; see also Niiniluoto, ) argue that the intuition that scientific progress requires justification can be accommodated within the truthlikeness account in virtue of the fact that justification is required for a rational estimation of expected truthlikeness. Yet another response is provided by Dellsén (), who argues that we mistakenly hesitate to attribute progress in the absence of justification because we tend to disapprove of the means by which scientists make progress in cases of that sort.…”

Section: Progress and Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Scientific progress: Four accounts

Dellsén

2018

Philosophy Compass

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Scientists are constantly making observations, carrying out experiments, and analyzing empirical data. Meanwhile, scientific theories are routinely being adopted, revised, discarded, and replaced. But when are such changes to the content of science improvements on what came before? This is the question of scientific progress. One answer is that progress occurs when scientific theories "get closer to the truth," i.e., increase their degree of truthlikeness. A second answer is that progress consists in increasing theories' effectiveness for solving scientific problems. A third answer is that progress occurs when the stock of scientific knowledge accumulates. A fourth and final answer is that scientific progress consists in increasing scientific understanding, i.e., the capacity to correctly explain and reliably predict relevant phenomena. This paper compares and contrasts these four accounts of scientific progress, considers some of the most prominent arguments for and against each account, and briefly explores connections to different forms of scientific realism.

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“…Recently, Dellsén (2016a) maintained that Bird's account of scientific progress is inadequate, and proposed the noetic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when scientists achieve increased understanding of a phenomenon.…”

Section: The Noetic Account Of Scientific Progressmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Noetic Account of Scientific Progress and the Factivity of Understanding

Sterpetti

2018

Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics

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There are three main accounts of scientific progress: 1) the epistemic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when there is an increase in knowledge; 2) the semantic account, according to which progress is made when the number of truths increases; 3) the problem-solving account, according to which progress is made when the number of problems that we are able to solve increases. Each of these accounts has received several criticisms in the last decades. Nevertheless, some authors think that the epistemic account is to be preferred if one takes a realist stance. Recently, Dellsén proposed the noetic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when scientists achieve increased understanding of a phenomenon. Dellsén claims that the noetic account is a more adequate realist account of scientific progress than the epistemic account. This paper aims precisely at assessing whether the noetic account is a more adequate realist account of progress than the epistemic account.

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Scientific progress: Knowledge versus understanding

Cited by 72 publications

References 48 publications

How Intellectual Communities Progress

How Intellectual Communities Progress

Scientific progress: Four accounts

The Noetic Account of Scientific Progress and the Factivity of Understanding

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