How Intellectual Communities Progress

Abstract

Recent work takes both philosophical and scientific progress to consist in acquiring factive epistemic states such as knowledge. However, much of this work leaves unclear what entity is the subject of these epistemic states. Furthermore, by focusing only on states like knowledge, we overlook progress in intermediate cases between ignorance and knowledge-for example, many now celebrated theories were initially so controversial that they were not known. This paper develops an improved framework for thinking about intellectual progress. Firstly, I argue that we should think of progress relative to the epistemic position of an intellectual community rather than individual inquirers. Secondly, I show how focusing on the extended process of inquiry (rather than the mere presence or absence of states like knowledge) provides a better evaluation of different types of progress. This includes progress through formulating worthwhile questions, acquiring new evidence, and increasing credence on the right answers to these questions. I close by considering the ramifications for philosophical progress, suggesting that my account supports rejecting the most negative views while allowing us to articulate different varieties of optimism and pessimism.

Understanding scientific progress: the noetic account

“… 9 Some earlier discussions of scientific progress (e.g., Bird 2007 ; Dellsén 2016 ) appear to assume that progress is determined by changes in the attitudes of individual scientists. More recently, Bird ( 2019 ) (see also Ross 2020 and Harris 2021 ) has argued that progress is determined by the collective attitudes of scientific communities, where the latter are not neatly reducible to individual attitudes. Relatedly, Niiniluoto ( 2017 , p. 2399) refers to it as a “hidden assumption” that “the primary application of the notion of scientific progress concerns successive theories which have been accepted by the scientific community”.…”

Thinking about Progress: From Science to Philosophy

“…15 On this point, see Rowbottom, 2008. 16 Bird (2010 argues for the latter version of the epistemic account; Gilbert (2000) and Ross (2020) give a more general argument that the scientific community is the agent whose epistemic states determine whether we make scientific progress. 17 Bird (2007, 84) and Dellsén (2016, 77-78) refer to the amount of progress made over a given period of time as the 'rate' of progress.…”

“…Fourth, another important issue concerns the agent(s) whose psychological or epistemic states determine whether progress has occurred (see, e.g., Bird, 2019; Gilbert, 2000; Ross, 2020). For ease of discussion, consider the epistemic account specifically (analogous issues arise for alternative accounts).…”

“…1616Bird (2010, 2014, 2019) argues for the latter version of the epistemic account; Gilbert (2000) and Ross (2020) give a more general argument that the scientific community is the agent whose epistemic states determine whether we make scientific progress.…”

Attentional progress by conceptual engineering

“…Maybe philosophers would gain in terms of the cognitive virtue of proper attunement. But it makes sense to think of philosophers as serving the wider research community or the society at large: delivering truths, knowledge, or understanding to others, rather than acquiring epistemic or other goods for 10 E.g., Chalmers 2015, Cappelen 2017, Stoljar 2017, Blackford and Broderick 2017, Hermann et al 2020, Ross 2021, Dellsén, Lawler, and Norton 2021 For example, Stoljar (2017, 21) and Gutting (2009) focus on knowledge as the aim. Chalmers frames his benchmark for progress in terms of truth (collective convergence to the truth about the big questions); but he also suggests that pervasive disagreement is worrying because it shows that philosophers are not gaining knowledge, either individually or collectively (2015,(14)(15)(16).…”