In this essay, moral anti-theodicy is characterized as opposition to the trivialization of suffering, defined as the reinterpretation of horrendous evils in a way the sufferer cannot accept. Ambitious theodicy (which claim goods emerge from specific evils) is deemed always to trivialize horrendous evils and, because there is no specific theoretical context, also harm sufferers. Moral anti-theodicy is susceptible to two main criticisms. First, it is over-demanding as a moral position. Second, anti-theodicist opposition to least ambitious theodicies, which portray God's decision to create as an 'all-or-nothing' scenario, requires a moral commitment to philosophical pessimism. Thus anti-theodicists should not be quick to take the moral high ground. However, this should not encourage theodicists, since theodicies may well be self-defeating in so far as they attempt to provide comfort.
IntroductionThis is an essay about moral anti-theodicy -objections to the practice of theoretical theodicy on moral grounds. Such objections have been presented by both atheists and theists. Therefore, this essay is not concerned with the attempt to solve or prove the problem of evil. Rather its aim is to assess anti-theodicy as a moral argument.I have not given a fine-grained account of the great variety of theodicies on offer. The most important distinction in the essay is that of most or least ambitious theodicies, since this refers to the sort of explanation or reasons a theodicy tries to give (see Trakakis (), f.). Thus Hick and Plantinga are in the same 'lowambition' category, although they disagree in several important ways. It turns out that the morality of theodicy depends significantly on how ambitious a theodicy is.Religious Studies (2013) 49, 439-458