Moral critique and defence of theodicy

Abstract

In this essay, moral anti-theodicy is characterized as opposition to the trivialization of suffering, defined as the reinterpretation of horrendous evils in a way the sufferer cannot accept. Ambitious theodicy (which claim goods emerge from specific evils) is deemed always to trivialize horrendous evils and, because there is no specific theoretical context, also harm sufferers. Moral anti-theodicy is susceptible to two main criticisms. First, it is over-demanding as a moral position. Second, anti-theodicist opposition to least ambitious theodicies, which portray God's decision to create as an 'all-or-nothing' scenario, requires a moral commitment to philosophical pessimism. Thus anti-theodicists should not be quick to take the moral high ground. However, this should not encourage theodicists, since theodicies may well be self-defeating in so far as they attempt to provide comfort. IntroductionThis is an essay about moral anti-theodicy -objections to the practice of theoretical theodicy on moral grounds. Such objections have been presented by both atheists and theists. Therefore, this essay is not concerned with the attempt to solve or prove the problem of evil. Rather its aim is to assess anti-theodicy as a moral argument.I have not given a fine-grained account of the great variety of theodicies on offer. The most important distinction in the essay is that of most or least ambitious theodicies, since this refers to the sort of explanation or reasons a theodicy tries to give (see Trakakis (), f.). Thus Hick and Plantinga are in the same 'lowambition' category, although they disagree in several important ways. It turns out that the morality of theodicy depends significantly on how ambitious a theodicy is.Religious Studies (2013) 49, 439-458

A critique of Samuel Shearn's moral critique of theodicies

“…In other words: it is possible both to accept the first-person perspective of a sufferer of horrendous evil and to problematize it when it is presented in the form of a third-person explanation of what the sufferer thinks about horrendous evils. It is not simply a question of preferring the one over the other as Shearn puts it (Shearn (2013), 9).…”

“…In part two, Shearn argues that theodicies are self-defeating if they aim to be beneficial to sufferers. For instance, he mentions parents witnessing their child's horrendous suffering due to a chronic illness with no cure and no end in sight (Shearn (2013), 11). As parents ourselves we of course feel anxious and gloomy merely imagining such a scenario.…”

“…Even if this particular case did not make certain kinds of theodicies self-defeating, Shearn also presents other arguments against ambitious theodicies meant to be comforting. He argues that ambitious theodicies present God's relationship to sufferers as an Ich–Es relation, since evil is something God allows for a logical reason, but sufferers can only be helped by an Ich–Du relationship, since for sufferers of horrendous evils it is only the personal attention and practical help of other people that will provide comfort (Shearn (2013), 11).…”

“…In part two, Shearn argues that ‘Theodicy, even if it is legitimate as an intellectual enterprise, is self-defeating if it aims to be beneficial to sufferers’ (Shearn (2013), 11). As an example, he asks us to think of parents with a child who suffers due to chronic illness with no treatment, and says that ‘Even the best news does not give meaning, for the daily struggle with the reality of that suffering engulfs and destroys any seeds of meaning’ ( ibid .).…”

Experiencing life and (religious) hope: pragmatic philosophies of religion

“…13 Royce does not trivialize suffering and evil by re-interpreting particular instances of loss in ways the sufferer cannot accept; he rather seeks to do justice, in his formal analysis of the (basic) structure of religious hope, to those motifs that-in the post-Leibnizian critique of full-blown, material "teleologies"-lead to moral "anti-theodicies." For the ongoing debate on teleology see Shearn (2013); for Royce's rejection of all forms of "external theodicy" see Foust (2012), and the critical considerations, in Viale (2013), concerning Foust's defense of Royce. 14 Like Dewey, Royce is convinced that, a) evils "are there to be conquered".…”