School environment and risk preferences: Experimental evidence

Eckel, Catherine C.; Grossman, Philip J.; Johnson, Cathleen; Oliveira, Angela C. M. de; Rojas, Christian; Wilson, Rick K.

doi:10.1007/s11166-012-9156-2

Cited by 65 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…The method used in this study has its origins in Binswanger (1980) and Eckel and Grossman (2008). This method presents a pictorial representation of the financial gambles, which was developed for use in low-literacy populations (Eckel et al ., 2012). …”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic preferences and obesity among a low-income African American community

Oliveira

Leonard

Shuval

et al. 2016

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Obesity has reached epidemic proportions in the US, with a significantly higher fraction of African Americans who are obese than whites. Yet there is little understanding of why some individuals become obese while others do not. We conduct a lab-in-field experiment in a low-income African American community to investigate whether risk and time preferences play a role in the tendency to become obese. We examine the relationship between incentivized measures of risk and time preferences and weight status (BMI), and find that individuals who are more tolerant of risk are more likely to have a higher BMI. This result is driven by the most risk tolerant individuals. Patience is not independently statistically related to BMI in this sample, but those who are more risk averse and patient are less likely to be obese.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic preferences and obesity among a low-income African American community

Oliveira

Leonard

Shuval

et al. 2016

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…We reproduced the risk, ambiguity and loss preferences elicitation task of Dai et al (2017) which is based on method with the presentation proposed by Eckel et al (2012). This mechanism has the advantage of being cognitively simple for subjects and giving less noisy estimates than more complex measures (Dave et al, 2010).…”

Section: Preference Elicitation: Attitudes Toward Risk Ambiguity Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Aiming to Choose Correctly or to Choose Wisely? The Optimality-Accuracy Trade-Off in Decisions Under Uncertainty

Garcia

Massoni

2017

SSRN Journal

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To cite this version:Thomas Garcia, Sébastien Massoni. Aiming to choose correctly or to choose wisely? The optimalityaccuracy trade-off in decisions under uncertainty . 2017. halshs-01631540WP 1714 -April 2017, this version November 2017 Aiming to choose correctly or to choose wisely? The optimality-accuracy trade-off in decisions under uncertainty Thomas Garcia, Sébastien Massoni Abstract:When making a decision under uncertainty, individuals aim to achieve opti-mality. In general, an accurate decision is optimal. However, in real life situations asymmetric stakes induce an unusual divergence between optimality and accuracy. We highlight this optimality-accuracy trade-off and study its origins using two experiments on perceptual decision making. We use Signal Detection Theory as a normative benchmark. The first experiment confirms the existence of an optimality-accuracy trade-off with a leading role of accuracy. The second experiment explains this trade-off by the concern of people for being right. Keywords:Optimality, accuracy, signal detection theory, incentives, experiment JEL codes: AbstractWhen making a decision under uncertainty, individuals aim to make the best choice. In general, the best solution, defined as the optimal solution, is the solution maximizing expected benefits. However, the quality of a decision can also be assessed based on the accuracy of the decision. While most of the time an accurate decision leads to the optimal decision, different types of successes and errors rewarded asymmetrically induce a divergence between accuracy and optimality. In this situation, individuals may face a trade-off between maximizing accuracy and maximizing expected benefits. Using Signal Detection Theory as a normative benchmark, we highlight this optimality-accuracy trade-off and study its origins using two laboratory experiments on perceptual decision-making. The first experiment confirms the existence of the trade-off with a leading role of accuracy. It also gives evidence on the prevalence of a payoff approach over an utility approach to assess *

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“…We elicited the participants' risk attitudes using a task developed by Eckel and Grossman (2008) and adopting a similar visual representation as Eckel et al (2012) and Cardenas and Carpenter (2013).…”

Section: Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Efficiency of Crackdowns: A Lab-In-The-Field Experiment in Public Transportations

2016

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Abstract:The concentration of high frequency controls in a limited period of time ("crackdowns") constitutes an important feature of many law-enforcement policies around the world. In this paper, we offer a comprehensive investigation on the relative efficiency and effectiveness of various crackdown policies using a lab-in-the-field experiment with real passengers of a public transport service. We introduce a novel game, the daily public transportation game, where subjects have to decide, over many periods, whether to buy or not a ticket knowing that there might be a control. Our results show that (a) concentrated crackdowns are less effective and efficient than random controls; (b) prolonged crackdowns reduce fare-dodging during the period of intense monitoring but induces a burst of fraud as soon as they are withdrawn; (c) pre-announced controls induces more fraud in the periods without control. Overall, we also observe that real fare-dodgers fraud more in the experiment than non-faredodgers. Keywords:Crackdowns, fraud, risk, monitoring, transportation, field experiment JEL codes: Abstract: The concentration of high frequency controls in a limited period of time ("crackdowns") constitutes an important feature of many law-enforcement policies around the world. In this paper, we offer a comprehensive investigation on the relative efficiency and effectiveness of various crackdown policies using a lab-in-the-field experiment with real passengers of a public transport service. We introduce a novel game, the daily public transportation game, where subjects have to decide, over many periods, whether to buy or not a ticket knowing that there might be a control. Our results show that (a) concentrated crackdowns are less effective and efficient than random controls; (b) prolonged crackdowns reduce fare-dodging during the period of intense monitoring but induces a burst of fraud as soon as they are withdrawn; (c) pre-announced controls induces more fraud in the periods without control. Overall, we also observe that real fare-dodgers fraud more in the experiment than non-fare-dodgers.

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School environment and risk preferences: Experimental evidence

Cited by 65 publications

References 57 publications

Economic preferences and obesity among a low-income African American community

Economic preferences and obesity among a low-income African American community

Aiming to Choose Correctly or to Choose Wisely? The Optimality-Accuracy Trade-Off in Decisions Under Uncertainty

The Efficiency of Crackdowns: A Lab-In-The-Field Experiment in Public Transportations

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