The Efficiency of Crackdowns: A Lab-In-The-Field Experiment in Public Transportations

Dai, Zhixin; Galeotti, Fabio; Villeval, Marie Claire

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2794574

Cited by 4 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…The fourth part consisted of a dynamic public transportation game in which subjects had to decide on whether buying or not a ticket and in which we manipulated the frequency and regularity of audits, and the information about the future occurrence of audits. The results of this fourth part are reported in Dai et al (2016). 15 Subjects have to report whether they are fully prepared to take risks or whether they prefer to avoid risks on a scale between 0 ("not at all willing to take risks") and 10 ("very willing to take risks"), using !…”

Section: Content Of the Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cheating in the Lab Predicts Fraud in the Field - An Experiment in Public Transportations

2016

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S Cheating in the Lab Predicts Fraud in the Field: An Experiment in Public TransportationsIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. We conduct an artefactual field experiment using a diversified sample of passengers of public transportations to study attitudes towards dishonesty. We find that the diversity of behavior in terms of dis/honesty in laboratory tasks and in the field correlate. Moreover, individuals who have just been fined in the field behave more honestly in the lab than the other fare-dodgers, except when context is introduced. Overall, we show that simple tests of dishonesty in the lab can predict moral firmness in life, although frauders who care about social image cheat less when behavior can be verified ex post by the experimenter.JEL Classification: B41, C91, C93, K42

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Section: Content Of the Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cheating in the Lab Predicts Fraud in the Field - An Experiment in Public Transportations

2016

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“…Here, it was found that concentrated inspections are not as effective nor efficient as random inspections, that prolonged inspections are only effective while they are ongoing and are also prone to inducing higher rates of fare evasion when they no longer take place, and that preannounced inspections are also prone to inducing higher rates of fare evasion when inspections do not take place (Dai et al, 2017). Based on these findings, Dai et al (2017) make the case for random inspections, as these are both effective and efficient. They argue that concentrated inspections, which they refer to as crackdowns, do not approach the level of effectiveness or efficiency of random inspections, unless they are also coupled with random inspections (Dai et al, 2017).…”

Section: Optimized Inspectionsmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…focusing inspection efforts on routes that are most prone to fare evasion, during times where it is more common) and raising awareness about enforcement through information campaigns (Barabino et al, 2013). Dai, Galeotti, and Villeval (2017) have furthered this discussion by determining what inspection strategies might be most effective in curbing fare evasion through an artefactual labin-the-field experiment conducted in Lyon, France, keeping the need for efficiency in mind.…”

Section: Optimized Inspectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a equitable approach to tackling the fare evasion problem: a scoping literature review and case study analysis

Cho¹

2022

Preprint

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<div>The widespread adoption of “proof-of-payment” ticketing systems by public transit corporations (PTCs) has renewed interest in the topic of fare evasion. Although this system has</div><div>many benefits, it has also been associated with higher rates of actual or perceived fare evasion. As such, many PTCs including the TTC in Toronto have also simultaneously invested in heightened measures to curb fare evasion. These measures, however, have usually taken the form of increased fines and policing, which have the potential to further disadvantage marginalized populations. A scoping literature review and case study analysis have been</div><div>employed to determine whether there is existing evidence that can make a case for the need for a more equitable solution to this problem, and to determine what alternative measures have been effective. Although there is much evidence to support the need for a more equitable approach, research into alternative measures is emerging and therefore somewhat inconclusive.</div>

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“…Residual deterrence involves enforcement officials temporarily reducing their enforcement having 'made their point'. The related work is primarily qualitative, observational, or experimental with laboratory games (Sherman 1990;Nagin 1998;Dai et al 2016;Banerjee et al 2014). There are some formal dynamic models in the enforcement 136 Legitimacy is said to drive expressive powers of law, tax compliance, and non-compliance to laws (McAdams 2000; Acemoglu and Jackson 2014; Bénabou and Tirole 2011; Kaplow and Shavell 2006;Hurd 1999;Chen et al 2014;.…”

Section: Residual Deterrencementioning

confidence: 99%

The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty? Evidence from British Commutations During World War I

Chen

2016

SSRN Journal

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During World War I, the British military condemned over 3,000 soldiers to death, but only executed 12% of them; the others received commuted sentences, unbeknownst to soldiers at the time. I verify that variation in commutations and executions is consistent with a random process. Using this result, I identify the effect of executions on subsequent desertions. There is limited evidence that executing deserters deterred absences, while executing Irish soldiers, regardless of the crime, spurred absences, particularly Irish absences. I present a model where perceived legitimacy of authority affects why people obey the law.

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The Efficiency of Crackdowns: A Lab-In-The-Field Experiment in Public Transportations

Cited by 4 publications

References 29 publications

Cheating in the Lab Predicts Fraud in the Field - An Experiment in Public Transportations

Cheating in the Lab Predicts Fraud in the Field - An Experiment in Public Transportations

Towards a equitable approach to tackling the fare evasion problem: a scoping literature review and case study analysis

The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty? Evidence from British Commutations During World War I

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