Sceptical theism and the problem of epistemic evil: Why sceptical theism is philosophically costly

Licon, Jimmy Alfonso

doi:10.5840/bjp2013526

Cited by 3 publications

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“…However, if we cannot rely on what seems to be good evidence for gratuitous suffering or evil, then why count anything else as sufficient evidence? Such a line of reasoning about the problem of epistemic evil inevitably leads to a very problematic form of skepticism (Licon 2013).…”

Section: Epistemic Theodicy Epistemic Evil and Responsibility For Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Theodicy, Epistemic Evil, and Epistemic Responsibility

Strahovnik

2023

Religions

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The paper explores the concept of epistemic theodicy and strengthens an argument that reconciles human fallibility with the existence of an all-powerful and benevolent God. This argument is grounded in epistemic responsibility, emphasizing our epistemic autonomy. The paper supports two aspects of this argument: the role of epistemic agency in shaping beliefs and belief formation based on experiential rationality. The paper begins by introducing the concept of epistemic theodicy and its relation to the problem of epistemic evil. Next, it presents a succinct version of the argument based on epistemic responsibility. The paper then focuses on epistemic agency, proposing a notion rooted in reasons-responsiveness and highlighting the agentive nature of belief formation. It provides an outline a of view of epistemic rationality grounded in experiential rationality, showing its compatibility with the responsibility-based response to the problem of epistemic evil. The conclusion reflects on the significance of these accounts of agency and rationality in the context of epistemic theodicy.

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Section: Epistemic Theodicy Epistemic Evil and Responsibility For Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Theodicy, Epistemic Evil, and Epistemic Responsibility

Strahovnik

2023

Religions

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“…Benton, John Hawthorne, and Yoaav Isaacs (2016). 16 See, for example, Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy (2003), Richard Gale (1996), Hudson (2014a) and (2017), Stephen Law (2014) and (2015), Jimmy Licon (2013), Stephen Maitzen (2013) and (2014), David O'Connor (2013), Bruce Russell (1996), Ian Wilks (2014), and Wielenberg (2010) and (2014). 17 However, Hudson offers several routes for the skeptical theist to respondthough, he does not find them satisfying.…”

Section: Department Of Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See, for example, Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy (), Richard Gale (), Hudson () and (), Stephen Law () and (), Jimmy Licon (), Stephen Maitzen () and (), David O'Connor (), Bruce Russell (), Ian Wilks (2014), and Wielenberg () and ().…”

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confidence: 99%

Skeptical Theism Unscathed: Why Skeptical Objections to Skeptical Theism Fail

Hendricks

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Arguments from evil purport to show that some fact about evil makes it (at least) probable that God does not exist. Skeptical theism is held to undermine many versions of the argument from evil: it is thought to undermine a crucial inference that such arguments often rely on. Skeptical objections to skeptical theism claim that it (skeptical theism) entails an excessive amount of skepticism and therefore should be rejected. In this article, I show that skeptical objections to skeptical theism have a very limited scope: only those who reject certain (apparently) popular epistemological theories will be threatened by them.

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We Are Not in the Dark

Hendricks¹

2021

American Philosophical Quarterly

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Critics of skeptical theism often claim that if it (skeptical theism) is true, then we are in the dark about whether (or for all we know) there is a morally justifying reason for God to radically deceive us. From here, it is argued that radical skepticism follows: if we are truly in the dark about whether there is a morally justifying reason for God to radically deceive us, then we cannot know anything. In this article, I show that skeptical theism does not entail that we are in the dark about whether (or for all we know) there is a morally justifying reason for God to deceive us. And hence arguments against skeptical theism that make use of this assumption fail.

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Sceptical theism and the problem of epistemic evil: Why sceptical theism is philosophically costly

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Epistemic Theodicy, Epistemic Evil, and Epistemic Responsibility

Epistemic Theodicy, Epistemic Evil, and Epistemic Responsibility

Skeptical Theism Unscathed: Why Skeptical Objections to Skeptical Theism Fail

We Are Not in the Dark

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