2013
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-37015-1_35
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SCADA System Security, Complexity, and Security Proof

Abstract: Modern Critical infrastructures have command and control systems. These command and control systems are commonly called supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA). In the past, SCADA system has a closed operational environment, so these systems were designed without security functionality. Nowadays, as a demand for connecting the SCADA system to the open network growths, the study of SCADA system security is an issue. A keymanagement scheme is critical for securing SCADA communications. Numerous key-mana… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…In conclusion, the approximate security lies in the range of 60 to 80 percent, which is comparatively low relative to the current research, which computed security results of 95 to 98 percent. Therefore, this study and others [25,[29][30][31][35][36][37][38][39][40]59,[91][92][93][94][95][96][97][98]101,102] conclude that security in any system should be significantly improved if a security mechanism can be a part of a system rather depending on an end-to-end approach. However, security developments are quite difficult to design and test inside of the protocol and the required depth knowledge of the protocol and other implementation details except security performance are more accurate and remarkable in these scenarios.…”
Section: Performance Evaluation and Comparisonmentioning
confidence: 90%
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“…In conclusion, the approximate security lies in the range of 60 to 80 percent, which is comparatively low relative to the current research, which computed security results of 95 to 98 percent. Therefore, this study and others [25,[29][30][31][35][36][37][38][39][40]59,[91][92][93][94][95][96][97][98]101,102] conclude that security in any system should be significantly improved if a security mechanism can be a part of a system rather depending on an end-to-end approach. However, security developments are quite difficult to design and test inside of the protocol and the required depth knowledge of the protocol and other implementation details except security performance are more accurate and remarkable in these scenarios.…”
Section: Performance Evaluation and Comparisonmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…However, the reference [88] conducted a study without deploying a cryptography buffer (or with a conceptual deployment) and transmission is limited to unicasting (or unicasting transmission). In general, several existing studies [91][92][93][94][95][96][97][98] were conducted to deploy and improve security in SCADA systems using cryptography mechanisms. Most of these are based on client/server architecture as part of a SCADA communication system.…”
Section: Performance Evaluation and Comparisonmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Due to the evolution of technology, the advanced version of DNP3 provides interconnectivity over the Internet; the information travels through non-proprietary protocols, which reside below DNP3 [5,19]. Due to open connectivity, DNP3 has been vulnerable to Internet attacks; most DNP3 devices are configured, and communicate without any proper authentication mechanism or have little protection in the SCADA network against vulnerabilities [23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30]. Cryptography based security mechanisms [31] have been proposed for DNP3 by DNP3 users group, in which symmetric and asymmetric methods are defined and a detailed description of challenge-response technique is made to examine the security goals (or parameters), such as authentication and integrity, and to protect the transmission against attacks, such as replay, spoofing, and modification attacks [8,32,33], at the application layer.…”
Section: Background Studymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, DNP3 frames are encapsulated in other security protocols including TLS/SSL and IPSec. A survey has been conducted on SCADA/DNP3 vulnerabilities [24][25][26][27]31], and mechanisms [32][33][34], such as anomaly detection and attacks detection, are used to detect the attacks, such as flooding attacks, DoSattack, spoofing, data modification, data reply, and man-in-the-middle attack, in SCADA/DNP3 communication [12,33,35,36]. A number of attacks is investigated [20,33,[35][36][37][38][39][40] by employing attack scenarios in the SCADA/DNP3 system, and the existence and potential influence of attacks are also measured.…”
Section: Background Studymentioning
confidence: 99%
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