Real Time MODBUS Transmissions and Cryptography Security Designs and Enhancements of Protocol Sensitive Information

Abstract

Information technology (IT) security has become a major concern due to the growing demand for information and massive development of client/server applications for various types of applications running on modern IT infrastructure. How has security been taken into account and which paradigms are necessary to minimize security issues while increasing efficiency, reducing the influence on transmissions, ensuring protocol independency and achieving substantial performance? We have found cryptography to be an absolute security mechanism for client/server architectures, and in this study, a new security design was developed with the MODBUS protocol, which is considered to offer phenomenal performance for future development and enhancement of real IT infrastructure. This study is also considered to be a complete development because security is tested in almost all ways of MODBUS communication. The computed measurements are evaluated to validate the overall development, and the results indicate a substantial improvement in security that is differentiated from conventional methods. OPEN ACCESSSymmetry 2015, 7 1177

Design and Development of Layered Security: Future Enhancements and Directions in Transmission

“…Under the first consideration, the APDU bytes were constructed and transmitted successfully several times (or 300 times) between the MTU and RTU and vice versa; here, we ensured and verified that the APDU bytes were accurately constructed and transmitted between the participant nodes. This consideration was investigated without the use of any security development, meaning that the APDU bytes were transmitted and all of the possible attacks such as Eavesdropping, Key Cracking, Man-in-the-Middle, Guessing Key (or Guessing Shared Key), Brute Force, Password Guessing, Frame Injection, Data Replay, and Data Deletion [ 5 , 56 , 57 ] were launched using built-in tools such as sniffer/dsniff, cracking tools, ethereal, ettercap, aircrack, airsnort, dinject/reinject, injection/jamming tools, and/or attack-detection mechanisms [ 54 , 55 , 56 , 57 , 60 , 61 , 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 , 67 , 68 , 69 , 70 , 71 ]; this resulted in an abnormal transmission (or attack transmission) for the SCADA/DNP3 system and the system performances were also measured in the absence of security development. Some attack tools are designated, however, and can be used for wireless transmissions, and we also employed and tested the testbed under the wireless-connectivity condition [ 72 , 73 , 74 ].…”

Detecting Flooding Attacks in Communication Protocol of Industrial Control Systems

“…The research scholars worked and provided solutions for Man-in-the middle attack, replay attacks etc. [20].…”

An integrated testbed for locally monitoring SCADA systems in smart grids

“…In order to allow for, e.g., floating point variables, some vendors allow for combining registers to hold 32-bit and 64-bit values (Hadžiosmanović et al 2014). Security extensions for Modbus/TCP protocol have been proposed, e.g., (Fovino et al 2009;Shahzad et al 2015;Éva et al 2018), which, however, do require changes on the protocol level of operating devices. This is expected to be difficult as companies are reluctant to such changes and global standardization.…”