Saving Objectivity for Feminism: MacKinnon, Marx, and Other Possibilities

Abstract

The article argues that feminist theory needs a concept of objectivity as part of its working epistemology. "Objectivity" is not, as has been argued by some contemporary feminists, inevitably a "dichotomist male epistemological construct," leading to psychological distance and the hierarchies of "knower" and "known" that have victimized many groups in liberal society. The article analyzes Catherine MacKinnon's critique of "objectivity" as one of the most explicit, sophisticated and compelling theories demonstrating current feminist mistrust of "objectivity." It finds that even MacKinnon uses "objectivity" in a one-dimensional manner, equating epistemological objectivity with political objectification.

From Aperspectival Objectivity to Strong Objectivity: The Quest for Moral Objectivity

“…Without denying the importance of these concerns, I suggest that, for the purposes of this paper, feminist epistemology is best understood as a project. As part of this work-in-progress, some theorists are extending earlier feminist investigations of the concept of objectivity (Bordo 1987;Fee 1981;Grosz 1987;Haraway 1989;Hartsock 1983;Hawkesworth 1994;Keller 1987;Longino 1990;Ring 1987;Rose 1987;Ruddick 1993). At the same time they are exploring "what ought to be done about epistemological principles," in order to make better (in the sense of less distorted) knowledge that can reflect feminist concerns (Code 1994;Harding 1991;Welton 1994).…”

From Aperspectival Objectivity to Strong Objectivity: The Quest for Moral Objectivity

“…Without denying the importance of these concerns, I suggest that, for the purposes of this paper, feminist epistemology is best understood as a project. As part of this work‐in‐progress, some theorists are extending earlier feminist investigations of the concept of objectivity (Bordo 1987; Fee 1981; Grosz 1987; Haraway 1989; Hartsock 1983; Hawkesworth 1994; Keller 1987; Longino 1990; Ring 1987; Rose 1987; Ruddick 1993). At the same time they are exploring “what ought to be done about epistemological principles,” in order to make better (in the sense of less distorted) knowledge that can reflect feminist concerns (Code 1994; Harding 1991; Welton 1994).…”

“…2 2 Feminist empiricism has always argued that androcentric bias is correctable by a stricter adherence to the value‐neutral methodological norms of science (S. Harding 1986). Where feminist standpoint theory has argued that scientific method is flawed by a blind faith in objectivity (Addelson 1983, 12), it is arguing for an expanded understanding of what is meant by the terms rationalism and objectivity (Code 1991; Haraway 1991; S. Harding 1986; Longino 1990; Ring 1987; Sells 1993). …”