Saunders and Wallace on Everett and Lewis

Tappenden, Paul

doi:10.1093/bjps/axn019

Cited by 14 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…While this interpretation of the personal identity facts can be questioned on independent grounds (e.g. see Tappenden (2008)), the Time-Slicer will also be wary of the fact that this framework rejects No Reference, since it gives different verdicts depending on the correct theory of personal identity.…”

Section: The Third Argument: the Diachronic Argument Against Doubmentioning

confidence: 99%

Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief

Builes

2019

Philos Stud

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Section: The Third Argument: the Diachronic Argument Against Doubmentioning

confidence: 99%

Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief

Builes

2019

Philos Stud

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“…I queried Saunders' and Wallace's overlap proposal, arguing that the putative pre-measurement observer U and observer D would not each be able to make indexical reference to their own bodies since before measurement their bodies have their temporal parts in common, like the overlapping roads [21]. Responding to that criticism, Saunders and Wallace emphasized that their analysis depends on an idea from linguistics known as the principle of interpretive charity, opening their reply to me with a quote from the philosopher of language Donald Davidson [22].…”

Section: Overlapmentioning

confidence: 99%

Everett’s Multiverse and the World as Wavefunction

Tappenden

2019

Quantum Reports

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Everett suggested that there’s no such thing as wavefunction collapse. He hypothesized that for an idealized spin measurement the apparatus evolves into a superposition on the pointer basis of two apparatuses, each displaying one of the two outcomes which are standardly thought of as alternatives. As a result, the observer ‘splits’ into two observers, each perceiving a different outcome. There have been problems. Why the pointer basis? Decoherence is generally accepted by Everettian theorists to be the key to the right answer there. Also, in what sense is probability involved, when all possible outcomes occur? Everett’s response to that problem was inadequate. A first attempt to find a different route to probability was introduce by Neil Graham in 1973 and the path from there has led to two distinct models of branching. I describe how the ideas have evolved and their relation to the concepts of uncertainty and objective probability. Then I describe the further problem of wavefunction monism, emphasized by Maudlin, and make a suggestion as to how it might be resolved.

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“…This line of thought has recently been explored in the context of Everettian quantum mechanics (see e.g. [Saunders 1998], , [Lewis 2007b], [Tappenden 2008). The discussion is obscured not only by the metaphysics of personal identity, but also by the unfortunate choice of English sentences, rather than propositions, as the bearers of probability.…”

Section: Ockhamismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Belief Update across Fission

Schwarz

2015

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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When an agent undergoes fission, how should the beliefs of the fission results relate to the pre-fission beliefs? This question is important for the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, but it is of independent philosophical interest. Among other things, fission scenarios demonstrate that "self-locating" information can affect the probability of uncentred propositions even if an agent has no essentially self-locating uncertainty. I present a general update rule for centred beliefs that gives sensible verdicts in cases of fission, without relying on controversial metaphysical or linguistic assumptions. The rule is supported by the same considerations that support standard conditioning in the traditional framework of uncentred propositions. * This paper once fissioned from [Schwarz 2012], which presents the same update rule, but (in the published version) sets aside cases of fission. Thanks to Christopher Meacham, Paolo Santorio and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussion.

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Saunders and Wallace on Everett and Lewis

Cited by 14 publications

References 7 publications

Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief

Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief

Everett’s Multiverse and the World as Wavefunction

Belief Update across Fission

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