Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief

Builes, David

doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01358-1

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Of course, one can easily find many more than three theories of selflocating belief in the philosophy literature. (For helpful overview see Titelbaum 2013Titelbaum , 2016; for a few more recent approaches see also Meacham 2016;Arntzenius and Dorr 2017;Schwarz 2017;Builes 2020). But many of the differences between these theories are in their answers to questions that don't immediately arise here: questions about the passage of time, forgetting information, or people or universes that undergo fission and branching.…”

Section: Three Rules For Self-locating Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence

Isaacs

Hawthorne

Russell

2022

The Philosophical Review

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Is the fact that our universe contains fine-tuned life evidence that we live in a multiverse? Ian Hacking and Roger White influentially argue that it is not. We approach this question through a systematic framework for self-locating epistemology. As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse (at least in a suitably idealized setting). This convergence is no accident: we present two theorems showing that, in this setting, any updating rule that satisfies a few reasonable conditions will have the same feature. The conclusion that fine-tuned life provides evidence for a multiverse is hard to escape.

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Section: Three Rules For Self-locating Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence

Isaacs

Hawthorne

Russell

2022

The Philosophical Review

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The epistemic objection against perdurantism

Tullio,

Soriani

2024

Synthese

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According to Perdurantism, persons are identical to maximal aggregates of appropriately interrelated temporal parts. Within the Perdurantist framework, an epistemic concern arises, targeting the perduring persons’ belief that they are persons, suggesting that, ultimately, they are not in a position to know that they are persons as opposed to temporal parts. Despite the consideration it has received over the years, this concern has not yet been converted into a full-fledged objection. This paper aims to address this gap by exploring the possibility of formulating a coherent Epistemic Objection against Perdurantism. We shall examine several epistemological principles around which such an objection might be built, arguing that none of them, in the end, allows a plausible formulation of the objection. As a result, we shall conclude that the burden of proving that in a Perdurantist setting persons are not in a position to know that they are persons rests with the objectors.

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Doppelgänger Changes the Game

Janda

2023

Episteme

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Thirders sometimes feel compelled to give the same answer – a credence of 1/3 – to the original and the duplicating Sleeping Beauty problem, which leads to some unwanted consequences. I will argue that they do not have to feel compelled to give the same answer, because the original and the duplicating version of the Sleeping Beauty problem are different types of decision problems. If one accepts that it is rationally permissible to give different answers to different types of decision problems, both versions do not require the same solution.

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Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief

Cited by 5 publications

References 50 publications

Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence

Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence

The epistemic objection against perdurantism

Doppelgänger Changes the Game

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