Sanctions and Security: The League of Nations and the Italian–Ethiopian War, 1935–1936

Abstract

The imposition of limited sanctions against Italy was given fair prospect of success by members of the League. Sanctions were to have a twofold purpose. One was to uphold the Covenant and encourage collective security. The other was to end the war by putting pressure on the Italian government so as to make it amenable to a negotiated settlement. It was expected that economic and financial measures (as opposed to military means) would be sufficient, over a period of time, to achieve this. The timetable was upset by unexpected political events and by the collapse of Ethiopian military resistance. Policies are explained, events discussed, and to illuminate some dilemmas a distinction (not then well perceived) is made between politically important “consumatory” assumptions and diplomatically operative “instrumentalist” and reconciliationist practices.

Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset

“…Research on economic sanctions has progressed significantly over the past two decades. Prior to that time, most studies were of a single case and generally focused on explaining why sanctions had not, and could not, “work” in the particular example under investigation (Baer, 1973; Galtung, 1967; Hoffman, 1967; Olson, 1979; Schreiber, 1973; von Amerongen, 1980; Wallensteen, 1983). These studies tended to focus on prominent cases that were “prominent” precisely because they had gone on for a long time without success.…”

Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining

“…Early studies, evaluating the foreign policy utility of sanctions, frequently concluded that sanctions are unsuccessful even when diligently applied over extended periods (e.g. Galtung, 1967; Hoffman, 1967; Schreiber, 1973; Baer, 1973; Doxey, 1980; von Amerongen, 1980; Wallensteen, 1983; Pape 1997, 1998). These findings, suggesting that sanctions rarely manage to alter the target’s policies, triggered a twofold response in the literature.…”

Strategic Demands, Credible Threats, and Economic Coercion Outcomes

“…Eventually, Taiwan increased its trafficking penalties, and in July 1995 the sanctions were lifted after accomplishing their objective (Greenhouse 1995). Why Clinton sanctioned Taiwan is not puzzling—the traditional scholarly perspective sees sanctions precisely as coercive instruments designed to alter the target’s position on some disputed policy issue (for example, Galtung 1967; Baer 1973; Schreiber 1973; von Amerongen 1980; Doxey 1980; Wallensteen 1983; Dashti‐Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997; Drury 1998; Bolks and Al‐Sowayel 2000; Allen 2005; Blake and Klemm 2006; Drury and Li 2006; Ang and Peksen 2007; Lektzian and Souva 2007). What is more interesting, however, is that Clinton did not sanction China despite allegations that it was in fact a much worse violator of international conventions against trade in rhino and tiger parts.…”