Saddam's Delusions: The View from the Inside

Woods, Kevin M.; Lacey, James; Murray, Williamson

doi:10.2307/20031964

Cited by 44 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In general, the diplomatic causes of the Iraq War remain understudied and perhaps underappreciated, despite some excellent works (Antonopolous 2004;Clarke 2004;Malone 2006). This is ironic because subjectively at least one key actor who believed that diplomacy would avert a war was Saddam himself (Braut-Hegghammer 2006;Woods, Lacey, and Murray 2006). Like the Kuwait question, this counterfactual brought about indecisive changes in participant views.…”

Section: The Iraq Virtual History Conferencementioning

confidence: 99%

Using a Virtual History Conference to Teach the Iraq War

Gilley

2013

Journal of Political Science Education

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In teaching the causes of the Iraq War, the use of ''virtual history'' can be employed in a conference setting in which different individuals are assigned to different plausible counterfactuals they use to construct virtual histories. The Iraq War lends itself to the virtual history approach because of the availability of many plausible counterfactuals at each of the various levels of analysis (individual, state=group, and international) at which the war has been explained. I report here on both the theoretical and pedagogical value of the virtual history conference in the study of the Iraq War.

show abstract

Section: The Iraq Virtual History Conferencementioning

confidence: 99%

Using a Virtual History Conference to Teach the Iraq War

Gilley

2013

Journal of Political Science Education

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…It seems that Hussein was trying: (i) to avoid disclosures about Iraq's past activities that would arouse suspicion (see U.S. Congress 2004) and (ii) to maintain a credible deterrence threat (to employ nonconventional weapons if necessary) while disarming so as not to give foreign adversaries a pretext to attack or sanction Iraq (Duelfer 2004;Woods, Lacey, and Murray 2006). Even cooperative gestures will not allay concerns abroad that a ''devious'' leader will accept costs of cooperation-as from restarting a closed facility or maintaining a second program in secret-to achieve nefarious goals.…”

Section: Lessons From the ''Rogue-state'' Threatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perception and Politics in Intelligence Assessment: U.S. Estimates of the Soviet and “Rogue-State” Nuclear Threats

Lebovic

2009

International Studies Perspectives

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

United States estimates of Soviet nuclear goals and capabilities and the current ''rogue-state'' nuclear threat reflected prevailing beliefs about threat within the U.S. government and the relative influence of agencies charged with threat assessment. This article establishes that the patterns in formal Soviet threat assessment: (i) did not reflect a uniform response to ''external threat,'' (ii) were inevitably tied to underlying assumptions about adversary intent, and (iii) were susceptible then to perceptual, organizational, and ⁄ or political influences within government. Thus, threat assessments reflected the optimism and pessimism-and political interests and ideologies-of those who participated in the estimating process. The article concludes by examining these lessons in light of the experiences and challenges of assessing threat from small states harboring nuclear ambitions.

show abstract

“…In sum, the dynamics of the evolution of these perceptions and delusions were such that, as the end neared, ''Saddam and those around him believed virtually every word issued by their own propaganda machine,'' and many, especially in Iraq's lower echelons, as well as external analysts and policymakers, believed that useable stockpiles of WMD existed. 59 (d) With regard to individual rational choice, in the context of pursuit of fundamental goals, among Saddam Hussein's tactics were the brutal coercion and repression of all imagined, potential, and real domestic opponents. Betty Glad has noted that another characteristic of the malignant narcissist is the use of excessive, extreme cruelty and brutality, often to the point of overreaching, in the suppression and destruction of opponents.…”

Section: International Journal Of Intelligencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the end, Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray noted that ''the single most important element in Saddam's strategic calculus was his faith that France and Russia would prevent an invasion by the United States,'' or, if that failed, ''Washington would rapidly bow to international pressure to halt [a] war. ''56 Finally, consistent with the use by decisionmakers of mental heuristics such as historical analogies, Saddam had survived both his disastrous war with Iran and later the American-led onslaught in 1991 after his invasion of Kuwait, so he apparently foresaw a similar outcome as the most probable in 2003.…”

mentioning

confidence: 94%