Russia’s use of semi-state security forces: the case of the Wagner Group

Abstract

This article provides a definitive, in-depth case-study, using primarily Russian sources, of Russia's use of the informal "Wagner Group" private military company (PMC) and its antecedents (from 2012 to 2018) in Nigeria, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Syria, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. It explores why Russia has used this group without legalizing its existence or role. While Wagner is sometimes used in the same ways that other rational states use PMCs, corrupt informal networks tied to the Russian regime have also used it in ways that are not typical of other strong states and that potentially undermine Russian security interests. Understanding the Wagner Group is interesting for comparative academic studies of PMCs, because Wagner doesn't fit well any existing PMC category or template in the literature. It is also crucial for US and allied policy analysts attempting to attribute "Russian" actions in foreign theaters.

How to wield regional power from afar: a conceptual discussion illustrated by the case of France in Central Africa

“…It ranks well below France in terms of power share but defies the regional dominance in two ways. First, state-backed private military groups operate in the Central African Republic, where a Russian military basis is planned and the national security advisor of the President is Russian, thus challenging the predominance of France in the country (Marten 2019;Towfigh Nia 2020). Second, Russia is able to provide incumbent support to authoritarian presidents under domestic pressure, which is a key concern of Central African leaders and replicates the Russian backing of presidents in Central Asia (Tolstrup 2015).…”

Russian Intervention in Syria: Exploring the Nexus between Regime Consolidation and Energy Transnationalisation

“…Their presence has been debated more publicly following the death of Russian irregular fighters by US airstrikes near Deir ez-Zor in February 2018 (Murtasin, 2018). And even though difficult to authenticate, media reports have circulated a contract according to which a Moscow-registered front company for mercenary operations in Syria ‘would receive 25 percent of the proceeds from oil and gas production at fields its contractors capture and secure from Islamic State militants’ (Vasilyeva, 2017; see also Marten, 2019: 191). Raphael and Stokes (2011: 915) have found a similar logic at play when analysing US policies towards West African oil, where the sponsorship of infrastructure projects and the establishment of ‘forward operating locations’ (FOLs) constitutes a combination of economic and military policies to pacify potential competitors by acting as a ‘hegemonic stabiliser’.…”

Kaupallisten sotilaspalveluyritysten synty Venäjällä

“…Kuten Marten (2019b) huomauttaa, Deir-el-Zourin taistelu herättää kysymyksiä Wagnerryhmän ja Venäjän asevoimien suhteesta. Vahingossa syntyvien konfliktien estämiseksi Yhdysvaltain ja Venäjän edustajat olivat sopineet toimialueiden jaosta alueella jo 2015.…”

“…Mediatietojen mukaan nämä "siviilit" ovat olleet Wagner-ryhmän työntekijöitä. He ovat kouluttamisen lisäksi suojanneet venäläisiä rakennusprojekteja sekä Prigožinin omistamien Lobaye Invest ja Sewa Security -yhtiöiden toimintaa (Marten 2019b(Marten , 17, 2019a. Kolme Keski-Afrikan tasavaltaan asiaa selvittämään saapunutta venäläistä tutkivaa journalistia, Orhan Džemal, Aleksandr Rastorgujev ja Kirill Radtšenko, surmattiin epäilyttävissä oloissa heinäkuussa 2018 (Higgins ja Nechepurenko 2018).…”