2020
DOI: 10.1162/daed_a_01788
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Russia's Nuclear Weapons in a Multipolar World: Guarantors of Sovereignty, Great Power Status & More

Abstract: At a time of technological and political change in the international security environment, Russia continues to view nuclear weapons as guarantors of peace and security among great powers. Nuclear weapons also assure Russia's own great-power status and mitigate uncertainty in an emerging multipolar order. In a world where the United States pursues improved missile defense capabilities and appears to reject mutual vulnerability as a stabilizing factor, Moscow views its modernized nuclear arsenal as essential to … Show more

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Cited by 16 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…14 The logic of deterrence theory dictates that if enemies do not perceive commitments to retaliate with nuclear weapons as credible, they will be tempted to exploit this credibility gap and engage in aggression with impunity. Given the ongoing modernisation of the Russian nuclear arsenal, the continued reliance on nuclear weapons for Russia's international prestige and security (Fink and Oliker 2020), and the US and NATO's concerns about an alleged Russian nuclear "escalate-to-deescalate" doctrine (Ven Bruusgaard 2016, 2020, Department of Defense 2018, Kroenig 2018, Oliker and Baklitskiy 2018, Smetana 2018, the credibility of allied commitments arguably continues to be highly relevant also in today's strategic environment.…”
Section: Implications and Conclusionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…14 The logic of deterrence theory dictates that if enemies do not perceive commitments to retaliate with nuclear weapons as credible, they will be tempted to exploit this credibility gap and engage in aggression with impunity. Given the ongoing modernisation of the Russian nuclear arsenal, the continued reliance on nuclear weapons for Russia's international prestige and security (Fink and Oliker 2020), and the US and NATO's concerns about an alleged Russian nuclear "escalate-to-deescalate" doctrine (Ven Bruusgaard 2016, 2020, Department of Defense 2018, Kroenig 2018, Oliker and Baklitskiy 2018, Smetana 2018, the credibility of allied commitments arguably continues to be highly relevant also in today's strategic environment.…”
Section: Implications and Conclusionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our participants received vignettes describing a military conflict between Russia and NATO countries in the Baltics. Many Western analysts argue that this is where the threat of Russian nuclear use primarily lies nowadays: facing conventionally superior NATO armies, Moscow could conduct a limited nuclear strike to “de-escalate” the conflict, compel NATO to meet the Russian leadership at the negotiating table, and ultimately score a political victory (Davis et al 2019; Kroenig 2018; Kühn 2018; Sokov 2014; Zysk 2018; Cimbala and McDermott 2016; Luik and Jermalavicius 2017; Schneider 2018; Fink and Oliker 2020). 1 Given that nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare since 1945 and their employment would certainly be seen as an extraordinary measure by the Russian public, our scenarios portray a high-stakes situation where nuclear use could conceivably prevent a strongly undesirable outcome – a military defeat in a prominent, great power conflict.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It seeks nuclear superiority and now focuses on new technologies and weapons systems intended to degrade the Russian nuclear deterrent and make nuclear weapons more usable. 39 Not only have U.S. and Russian views on what threatens strategic stability sharply diverged, making preserving, let alone extending, the nuclear arms con trol process a fading prospect, but the way each side now both defines the spe cific threat that it sees in the other side's weapons programs and doctrinal shifts and prepares to counter them seems likely to increase the chance of inadver tent escalation across the nuclear threshold. In the meantime, Li argues, the dis parity between the size of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and those of all other countries means that the numerical aspects of U.S.Russian arms con trol treaties "cannot apply to China."…”
Section: Strategic Stability and Nuclear Warmentioning
confidence: 99%