Russia and its supporters in Europe: trans-ideologyà la carte?

Partisan views of Russia: Analyzing European party electoral manifestos since 1991

“…For example, as Braghiroli (2015) demonstrates, the liberal parties in the European Parliament, which focus on human rights, tend to be more critical of Russia's human rights record. Given Russia's recent attempts to promote itself as a standard-bearer for the cooperation of sovereign countries, traditional morality, and identitarianism, we could expect that the fringe parties that argue that the West is in decay and that the supranational integration has reached too far would be more positively attuned to Russia over time (Braghiroli & Makarychev, 2016;Gressel, 2017;Klapsis, 2017). While far-right parties are frequently associated with such belief, appeals to morality and limits to European integration are not limited to far-right parties (Stéphane & Schmitt, 2015).…”

“…However, especially after the conflict in Georgia, a development of an increasingly negative attitude could be expected. Even if some parties in Europe saw Russia as merely reacting to Georgia's provocations (Braghiroli & Makarychev, 2016;Klapsis, 2017), Russia's willingness to violate the sovereignty of another country could be expected to cause unease among European parties.…”

“…While most of the scholarly attention has focused on the connection between the far right (and populist) parties and Russia, scholars have noted too that the appeal to anti-imperialism and the fight against the American hegemony has also provided a connection between the far left and Russia (Braghiroli & Makarychev, 2016;Stéphane & Schmitt, 2015). Curiously, little conceptual link has been done between the scholarship studying extreme parties' connections with (and interest in) Russia on one hand, and the increasing academic interest in the study of the role of political parties in foreign policy on the other hand.…”

Where is the middle? Considering the socio-political centre in Germany

“…Others were sympathetic towards it. Most fervent 'pro-Russia' views were held by AfD and Die Linke politicians and voters, exploited by the Kremlin's 'trans-ideological' appeals (Braghiroli & Makarychev, 2016. Despite an ostensible ideological hostility towards the other, and their usual positioning at opposite ends of a linear spectrum, mutual support for the Russian government and an aligned strident critique of the US brought 'far left' and 'far right' into agreement (Forsberg, 2016;Kluge et al, 2018).…”

Bordering and Identity-Making in Europe After the 2015 Refugee Crisis

“…When it comes to countries with sizeable ethnic diasporassuch as Estonia, but also Latvia or Germanyminority groups might also have their say in the refugee debate and thus significantly pluralize the overall picture. In this sense Russia appears among the most important outsiders that have their stakes in the refugee crisis and develop policies towards European countries with far-reaching political goals of influencing institutional and political landscapes in Europe (Braghoroli and Makarychev 2016). A number of observers claim that the Kremlin is actively trying to politically exploit the current state of instability and uncertainty faced by the EU, thereby profiting from (and actively promoting) the raising conflicts within political elites in EU member states and the growing gap between elites and public.…”