Roots of the Radical Right: Nostalgic Deprivation in the United States and Britain

Gest, Justin; Reny, Tyler T.; Mayer, Jeremy D.

doi:10.1177/0010414017720705

Cited by 199 publications

(181 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Portrayals of the alt-right vary widely. Some of these portrayals emphasize the movement's anti-globalist and anti-establishment views (Bokhari & Yiannopoulos, 2016; Guardian style editors, 2016), while others emphasize its interest in maintaining structures of group-based dominance and supremacy (Armstrong, 2017;Caldwell, 2016;Gest et al, 2017;Lyons, 2017). Employing a nationally representative random probability sample, we conducted the first quantitative empirical examination of the psychological profile and prevalence of the altright, comparing them to both non-alt-right supporting Trump voters and (non-alt-right supporting) non-Trump voters.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Psychological Profile of the Alt-Right

Forscher

Kteily

2019

Perspect Psychol Sci

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The 2016 U.S. presidential election coincided with the rise of the “alternative right,” or alt-right. Alt-right associates have wielded considerable influence on the current administration and on social discourse, but the movement’s loose organizational structure has led to disparate portrayals of its members’ psychology and made it difficult to decipher its aims and reach. To systematically explore the alt-right’s psychology, we recruited two U.S. samples: An exploratory sample through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk ( N = 827, alt-right n = 447) and a larger, nationally representative sample through the National Opinion Research Center’s Amerispeak panel ( N = 1,283, alt-right n = 71–160, depending on the definition). We estimate that 6% of the U.S. population and 10% of Trump voters identify as alt-right. Alt-right adherents reported a psychological profile more reflective of the desire for group-based dominance than economic anxiety. Although both the alt-right and non-alt-right Trump voters differed substantially from non-alt-right, non-Trump voters, the alt-right and Trump voters were quite similar, differing mainly in the alt-right’s especially high enthusiasm for Trump, suspicion of mainstream media, trust in alternative media, and desire for collective action on behalf of Whites. We argue for renewed consideration of overt forms of bias in contemporary intergroup research.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Psychological Profile of the Alt-Right

Forscher

Kteily

2019

Perspect Psychol Sci

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“…Economically vulnerable workers are a substantial part of radical right parties' electorates (Kriesi et al, 2008;Mayer, 2015). To appeal to such workers, they frequently refer to a nostalgic 'better' past prior to economic and societal upheavals (Gidron and Hall, 2017;Gest et al, 2018;Im et al, 2019). Their discourse frequently blames processes such as international trade, European enlargement, and immigration for the 'worse' present (Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2016;Owen and Johnston, 2017;Colantone and Stanig, 2018;Goerres et al, 2018).…”

Section: Economic Vulnerability and Opposition To Immigrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Jobs at risk? Task routineness, offshorability, and attitudes toward immigration

Kaihovaara

2020

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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In this paper, we study the relationship between occupational vulnerability and attitudes toward immigration in Western Europe. We measure occupational vulnerability as the risk of unemployment due to routine-biased technological change and offshoring of jobs to other countries. Previous empirical studies in political economy have shown that individuals' policy preferences echo their economic risks and prospects. Workers in low routine occupations are most worried about their job market prospects, most likely to demand social protection and least likely to support free trade. We find that attitudes toward immigration become considerably more negative as occupational task routineness increases. We do not find a similar association between occupational offshorability and immigration attitudes. Direct exposure to global competition is not associated with increased worries about immigration. However, offshorability seems to be associated with the polarization of attitudes toward immigration between routine and nonroutine workers.

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“…Moreover, both Trump and Cruz portrayed America as a country that had lost its way, due in part to the nefarious influence of self-interested, morally corrupt political and intellectual elites (Kazin 2016;Newmyer 2015). By imbuing their nationalist vision with nostalgic and populist themes (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016;Gest et al 2018), both candidates sought to reach voters who were dissatisfied with the national status quo and yearned for a bygone era, presumably one in which white, Christian Americans occupied an unquestionably dominant place in the status hierarchy (Whitehead and Perry 2020). In contrast, the remaining candi-dates for the Republican nomination either downplayed nationalism altogether or relied on boilerplate patriotic imagery typical of creedal nationalism (Brooks 2015;Thompson 2015).…”

Section: Nationalist Cleavages In the United Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Partisan Sorting of "America": How Nationalist Cleavages Shaped the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

Bonikowski¹,

Feinstein²,

Bock³

2019

Preprint

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Political scientists have acknowledged the importance of ethno-nationalism as a constitutive element of radical-right politics, but have typically empirically reduced the phenomenon to its downstream attitudinal correlates. Sociologists, on the other hand, have extensively studied nationalism, but have rarely weighed in on debates about institutional politics. In this study, we bring these literatures together by considering how nationalist beliefs shaped respondents' voting preferences in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and how the election outcome built on long-term changes in the distribution of nationalism in the U.S. population. The results suggest that competing understandings of American nationhood were effectively mobilized by candidates from the two parties, both in the 2016 primaries and the general election. Furthermore, over the past twenty years, nationalism has become sorted by party, as Republican identifiers have become predominantly ethno-nationalist and Democrats have increasingly endorsed creedal and disengaged conceptions of nationhood. This points to the rising demand for radical candidates among Republicans and suggests a potentially bleak future for U.S. politics, as nationalism becomes yet another among multiple overlapping social and cultural cleavages that serve to reinforce deep partisan divisions and undermine the stability of liberal democratic institutions.

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Roots of the Radical Right: Nostalgic Deprivation in the United States and Britain

Cited by 199 publications

References 32 publications

A Psychological Profile of the Alt-Right

A Psychological Profile of the Alt-Right

Jobs at risk? Task routineness, offshorability, and attitudes toward immigration

The Partisan Sorting of "America": How Nationalist Cleavages Shaped the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

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