Jobs at risk? Task routineness, offshorability, and attitudes toward immigration

Abstract

In this paper, we study the relationship between occupational vulnerability and attitudes toward immigration in Western Europe. We measure occupational vulnerability as the risk of unemployment due to routine-biased technological change and offshoring of jobs to other countries. Previous empirical studies in political economy have shown that individuals' policy preferences echo their economic risks and prospects. Workers in low routine occupations are most worried about their job market prospects, most likely to demand social protection and least likely to support free trade. We find that attitudes toward immigration become considerably more negative as occupational task routineness increases. We do not find a similar association between occupational offshorability and immigration attitudes. Direct exposure to global competition is not associated with increased worries about immigration. However, offshorability seems to be associated with the polarization of attitudes toward immigration between routine and nonroutine workers.

Labour market institutions and immigration policy attitudes: The moderated impact of economic vulnerability

“…First, the findings provide evidence in line with studies suggesting a non‐negligible economic basis of immigration policy attitudes focusing on prospective status in labour markets (Dancygier & Walter, 2015; Kaihovaara & Im, 2020; Pardos‐Prado & Xena, 2019; Pecoraro & Ruedin, 2016). Contributing to such debates, I suggested that less immigration may be desirable for the relatively more risk exposed as it provides an ex ante damper on stopping further uncertainty.…”

“…The average number of individual‐level observations in each country‐year unit is 740. Given my theoretical focus on the risk of being unemployed instead of the unemployment status, the analysis is restricted to actively employed respondents similar to comparable work (Kaihovaara & Im, 2020; Polavieja, 2016).…”

“…Numerous studies have argued and showed that differently from the direct impact of immigration, economically motivated grievances driven by insecurity, labour market vulnerability and prospective job loss risks lead to anti‐immigration positions (Kaihovaara & Im, 2020; Pardos‐Prado & Xena, 2019). Yet, so far, scholars have scarcely focused on how this better‐known effect of economic vulnerability operates under different welfare state and labour market policy conditions.…”

“…Unlike earlier realistic group conflict studies (Jackson, 1993; Meuleman et al, 2009; Quillian, 1996), the consensus arising from this more recent body of work is that rather than merely focusing on the effects of immigration itself as the driver of attitudes, broader sources of economic vulnerability prevalent across the population need to be considered (Pardos‐Prado & Xena, 2019; Pecoraro & Ruedin, 2016). Thus far, researchers have explored fears over prospective job loss threats caused by automation, offshoring and deindustrialisation as predictors of opposition to immigration (Dancygier & Walter, 2015; Kaihovaara & Im, 2020; Pardos‐Prado, 2020; Polavieja, 2016). Therefore, even if concrete material vulnerabilities may have less to do with the economic impact of immigration directly, there appear to be substantive economic roots of what we observe in Western democracies regarding a nationalistic turn in support for closure in immigration policy (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2019; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018).…”

“…To address this gap, I put forward a micro–macro theoretical framework discerning the extent to which economically motivated grievances differ across European countries due to variation in labour market institutions. First, taking stock of the social policy attitudes literature, I apply a risk‐insurance framework (Alt & Iversen, 2017; Rehm, 2016) and contend that more restrictive immigration attitudes of the risk exposed people can be thought of as indicative of preferences for receiving ex ante protection by the state to limit uncertainty (Kaihovaara & Im, 2020; Pardos‐Prado & Xena, 2019). I argue that the more risk‐exposed workers prefer less immigration to contain risks and preserve their prospective position and economic interests.…”