Robustness of Participatory Budgeting Outcomes: Complexity and Experiments

Boehmer, Niclas; Faliszewski, Piotr; Janeczko, Łukasz; Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-43254-5_10

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Another trend that stands out from Figure 3 is that the rules behave remarkably similarly, which means that all of them make roughly the same number of adjustments to account for changes in the election. This observation stands in partial contrast to previous theoretical and empirical results from the literature that different rules have a different sensitivity to random or adversarial changes in the election , Boehmer et al, 2023a]. Yet, voters in Polkadot elections certainly do not change their votes randomly.…”

Section: How Much Do Elections Change Over Time?contrasting

confidence: 85%

“…On a more general note, empirical works are more common in the context of ordinal voting. In terms of methodological contributions, the PrefLib Walsh, 2013, 2017] and Pabulib [Faliszewski et al, 2023a] databases, which contain large collections of real-world preference and participatory budgeting data and the recently developed map of elections framework [Szufa et al, 2020 are notable projects.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Proportional representation in matching markets: selecting multiple matchings under dichotomous preferences

2023

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Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding k matchings fairly representing everyone’s preferences. To formalize fairness, we apply the concept of proportional representation as studied in approval-based multiwinner elections. To this end, we model the problem as a multiwinner election where the set of candidates consists of matchings of the agents, and agents’ preferences over each other are lifted to preferences over matchings. Due to the exponential number of candidates in such elections, standard algorithms for classical sequential voting rules (such as those proposed by Thiele and Phragmén) are rendered inefficient. We show that the computational tractability of these rules can be regained by exploiting the structure of the approval preferences. Moreover, we establish algorithmic results and axiomatic guarantees that go beyond those obtainable in the classical approval-based multiwinner setting: Assuming that approvals are symmetric, we show that Proportional Approval Voting (PAV), a well-established but computationally intractable voting rule, becomes polynomial-time computable, and that its sequential variant, which does not provide any proportionality guarantees in general, fulfills a rather strong guarantee known as extended justified representation. Some of our algorithmic results extend to other types of compactly representable elections with an exponential candidate space.

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Section: How Much Do Elections Change Over Time?contrasting

confidence: 85%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%