2016
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150678
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Robust Social Decisions

Abstract: International audienceWe propose and operationalize normative principles to guide social decisions when individuals potentially have imprecise and heterogeneous beliefs, in addition to conflicting tastes or interests. To do so we adapt the standard Pareto principle to those preference comparisons that are robust to belief imprecision and characterize social preferences that respect this robust principle. We also characterize a suitable restriction of this principle. The former principle provides stronger guida… Show more

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Cited by 52 publications
(58 citation statements)
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“…They show that a stronger variant of Consensus Pareto implies that the social set of beliefs contains only a weighted average of individuals' beliefs. In the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) framework, Qu (2017) and Danan et al (2016) derive similar representation theorems for social preferences by employing other variants of ex ante Pareto in a context where neither individuals nor society conforms to SEU theory. 6 All these variants of ex ante Pareto are proposed to avoid the pitfalls of ex ante Pareto, and especially the problem of 'spurious unanimity', which is at the basis of the impossibility result.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…They show that a stronger variant of Consensus Pareto implies that the social set of beliefs contains only a weighted average of individuals' beliefs. In the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) framework, Qu (2017) and Danan et al (2016) derive similar representation theorems for social preferences by employing other variants of ex ante Pareto in a context where neither individuals nor society conforms to SEU theory. 6 All these variants of ex ante Pareto are proposed to avoid the pitfalls of ex ante Pareto, and especially the problem of 'spurious unanimity', which is at the basis of the impossibility result.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Posner and Weyl (2013), Blume et al (2015) and others identify contradictory beliefs as the main cause for purely speculative trades, and they argue in favor of public regulation of financial markets in this case. 7 Gilboa et al (2014) formulate a weaker variant of 6 Specifically, Qu (2017) assumes that both society and individuals conform to the MEU theory, whereas Danan et al (2016) consider the possibility that both society and individuals have Bewley-type preferences. For an excellent introduction to the theory of decision under uncertainty, see Gilboa (2009).…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our concept is closest to ( Gilboa et al 2010)'s "objectively rational" decision making. (Danan et al 2016) move this concept, which they call Unambiguous Preferences, farther toward a normative application, applying it to define robust social decisions. They focus on a social decision maker that has to synthetize multiple preferences and multiple beliefs.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In (Danan et al 2016), following much of the economics literature, individuals have direct preferences over probability distributions, rather than over outcomes and risk. Thus, one of our contributions is to re-state the concept of Belief Dominance in a general framework with clear distinctions between alternatives, beliefs, and preferences (Howard 1988), so that it can be operationalized as a prescriptive decision rule (Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky 1988).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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