“…For researching the delivery of public infrastructure, they typically make use of classical game theory and experimental behavioural economics (Altamirano & de Jong, 2009) with the aim of testing (and predicting) how different contractual incentives lead to specific patterns of behaviour. These games resemble the controlled setting or closed system of experimental research to "safely" explore/learn how specific rules would shape collaborative/adversarial relations in reality (Altamirano, Herder, & De Jong, 2008;Dzeng & Wang, 2017;Nassar, 2003). However, from a critical realist perspective which we adopt here, "it is a condition of the intelligibility of experimental activity that in an experiment the experimenter is a causal agent of a sequence of events but not of the causal law which the sequence of events enables him to identify" (Bhaskar, 1997, p. 11).…”