2014
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2013.03.006
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Risk-bearing by the state: When is it good public policy?

Abstract: The global financial crisis brought government guarantees to the forefront of the debate. Based on a review of frictions that hinder financial contracting, this paper concludes that the common justifications for government guarantees-i.e., principal-agent frictions or un-internalized externalities in an environment of risk neutrality-are flawed. Even where risk is purely idiosyncratic-and thus diversifiable in principle-government guarantees (typically granted via development banks/agencies) can be justified i… Show more

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Cited by 24 publications
(7 citation statements)
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References 40 publications
(41 reference statements)
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“…1 Anginer, de la Torre, and Ize, (2014) use banks in 74 countries to observe risk bearing by the state. During financial crises governments came to the rescue of troubled financial markets and institutions.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…1 Anginer, de la Torre, and Ize, (2014) use banks in 74 countries to observe risk bearing by the state. During financial crises governments came to the rescue of troubled financial markets and institutions.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In a context of high uncertainty, with lenders generally retrenching, governments have stepped in and absorbed the increased credit risk, ensuring that firms have access to resources during the hibernation phase. In particular, the state is generally in a good position to offer credit guarantees when there is high risk aversion (Anginer et al, 2014). Among other things, governments have capitalized state-owned banks; scaled up public credit guarantee programs (typically covering 70 percent to 90 percent of the loans); and supported large-scale purchases of portfolios of loans.…”
Section: Transferring Credit Risk To the Governmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…SoEs can internalize this source of risk even better than the State itself, since they implicitly “crowd‐in” private investors, and thence reduce the agency problems that could otherwise hamper governments (Anginer, de la Torre, & Ize, 2014; Engel et al., 2014).…”
Section: Theoretical and Conceptual Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%