The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic halted economic activity worldwide, hurting firms and pushing many of them toward bankruptcy. This paper discusses four central issues that have emerged in the academic and policy debates related to firm financing during the downturn. First, the economic crisis triggered by the pandemic is radically different from past crises, with important consequences for optimal policy responses. Second, it is important to preserve firms' relationships with key stakeholders (like workers, suppliers, customers, and creditors) to avoid inefficient bankruptcies and long-term detrimental economic effects. Third, firms can benefit from "hibernation," incurring the minimum bare expenses necessary to withstand the pandemic, while using credit if needed to remain alive until the crisis subdues. Fourth, the existing legal and regulatory infrastructure is ill-equipped to deal with an exogenous systemic shock like a pandemic. Financial sector policies can help increase the provision of credit, while posing difficult choices and trade-offs.
We study the effects of capital account liberalization on firm capital allocation and aggregate productivity in 10 Eastern European countries. Using a large firm‐level data set, we show that capital account liberalization decreases the dispersion in the return to capital across firms, particularly in sectors more dependent on external finance. We provide evidence that capital account liberalization improves capital allocation by allowing financially constrained firms to demand more capital and produce at a more efficient level. Finally, using a model of misallocation we document that capital account liberalization increases aggregate productivity through more efficient capital allocation by 10% to 16%.
This paper investigates the effect of cross-country differences in collateral laws regarding movable assets on lending and sectoral allocation of resources. Using micro-level loan data for a sample of emerging market countries we show that loan-to-values of loans collateralized with movable assets are on average 21 percentage points higher in countries with strong-collateral laws relative to immovable assets. Further, stronger collateral laws tilt collateral composition away from immovable to movable assets. We also provide evidence of a collateral class, including bank guarantees, for which enforcement is independent of collateral law. To examine the effect of collateral laws on real activity we map the relationship of collateral laws and collateral composition to asset-composition and sectoral resource allocation using industry-level output and employment data. Weak collateralization laws that discourage the use of movables assets as collateral create distortions in the allocation of resources that favor immovable-based production. The results shed light on an important channel -collateral laws -through which legal institutions affect lending and real economic activity.
, and the World Bank. Felipe Silva and Pablo Slutzky provided excellent research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.
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