Risk aversion and elite‐group ignorance

Abstract

Critical race theorists and standpoint epistemologists argue that agents who are members of dominant social groups are often in a state of ignorance about the extent of their social dominance, where this ignorance is explained by these agents' membership in a socially dominant group (e.g., Mills 2007). To illustrate this claim bluntly, it is argued: 1) that many white men do not know the extent of their social dominance, 2) that they remain ignorant as to the extent of their dominant social position even where this information is freely attainable, and 3) that this ignorance is due in part to the fact that they are white men. We argue that on Buchak's (2010Buchak's ( , 2013 model of risk averse instrumental rationality, ignorance of one's privileges can be rational. This argument yields a new account of elite-group ignorance, why it may occur, and how it might be alleviated.

On the Stability of Racial Capitalism

“…Individuals in this sort of system are making the best moves available to them, even those who reproduce the conditions of their own oppression as they do so. Those benefiting from the system have every incentive to resist moral education, perhaps by developing justifications for or ideologies supporting the social order (Kinney and Bright 2021). Those oppressed by the system may not be able to afford the sacrifices necessary to change it.…”

Risk, Rationality and (Information) Resistance: De-rationalizing Elite-Group Ignorance

“…Their reasoning process is consistent and stable even upon "vigorous intellectual effort" (Nguyen 2022), and because they are elite-groupa agents, their credences are a "[systemic overestimation of] their likelihood of facing negative consequences for certain risky behaviors" (Kinney and Bright 2021). However, given that John's reasoning process may be robust against criticisms (either externally or through internal reflection) of irrationality given that he is a Buchakian 9.…”

“…This is perhaps unsurprising: the more risk-averse an agent is, the more they scale up the worst-case scenario in their utility calculations, and therefore the lower their threshold of relevance before they get scared off learning. In addition, elite-group agents are likely to be risk-averse in gambles like Harassment, where the gamble is between a high probability of modest gain and low probability of significant loss (Kinney and Bright 2021); this therefore explains why elite-group agents robustly avoid information partly due to their risk-aversion.…”

“…What if it's because avoiding costless and relevant information about one's privilege could be rational and thus less likely to be swayed in response to criticisms of irrationality? For example, David Kinney and Liam Kofi Bright (2021) argue that within some decision frameworks plausibly regarded as frameworks of normative rationality (they use L. M. Buchak (2013) as an exemplar 2 ) , rational agents can permissibly avoid costless relevant information, 1. e.g. Duguid and Thomas-Hunt 2015;Wynn 2020, where debiasing efforts seem to have limited effectiveness in changing behaviour.…”

Debunking creedal beliefs

“…Relatedly, standpoint epistemologists and critical theorists have argued that members of dominant social groups are willfully ignorant of certain features of their position even where such information is easily available. For a classic discussion of this idea, seeMills (2007), and more recently,Kinney and Bright (2021) andWoomer (2017).4 For more on this distinction between instrumental and epistemic rationality, seeKelly (2003). See alsoFeldman (2000).…”