Risk, Rationality and (Information) Resistance: De-rationalizing Elite-Group Ignorance

Abstract

There has been a movement aiming to teach agents about their privilege by making the information about their privilege as costless as possible. However, some argue that in risk-sensitive frameworks, such as Lara Buchak's (2013), it can be rational for privileged agents to shield themselves from learning about their privilege, even if the information is costless and relevant. This threatens the efficacy of these information-access efforts in alleviating the problem of elite-group ignorance.In response, I show that even within the same framework, in this case David Kinney and Liam Kofi Bright's (2021), the rationality of this information avoidance rests on shaky ground in practice. In this framework, whether an agent should avoid information depends on the precise details of (1) how relevant they expect the information to be, (2) their priors about the value of various options, and (3) their risk attitudes. The model suggests that rationality of elite-group ignorance is a function of structural factors that are pervasive but nonetheless not insurmountable, thus offering a way out of pessimism about elite group education.

Rational Aversion to Information

“…For example elite-group ignorance, whichKinney and Bright (2021) explain using risk-weighted expected utility theory Yong (2023). critically discusses this explanation.31 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to clarify why Modesty is a plausible explanation of these cases of information aversion.…”