Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks

Martz, Harry F.; Johnson, Mark E.

doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.1987.tb00967.x

Cited by 26 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 4 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Another body of literature has attempted to model outages, but primarily by building scenarios and/or through grid network disruption estimates (see, for example, Ezell et al , 2000a, 2000b; Haimes, 1981; Salmeron et al , 2004; Lemon & Apostolakis, 2004; Apostolakis & Lemon, 2005). A third related literature uses scenario‐based or simulation‐based modeling of infrastructure interdependencies in general (see, for example, Garrick et al , 2004; Martz & Johnson, 1987; Masiello et al , 2004; Paté‐Cornell & Guikema, 2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk‐Management and Risk‐Analysis‐Based Decision Tools for Attacks on Electric Power

Simonoff¹,

Restrepo²,

Zimmerman³

2007

Risk Analysis

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Incident data about disruptions to the electric power grid provide useful information that can be used as inputs into risk management policies in the energy sector for disruptions from a variety of origins, including terrorist attacks. This article uses data from the Disturbance Analysis Working Group (DAWG) database, which is maintained by the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), to look at incidents over time in the United States and Canada for the period 1990-2004. Negative binomial regression, logistic regression, and weighted least squares regression are used to gain a better understanding of how these disturbances varied over time and by season during this period, and to analyze how characteristics such as number of customers lost and outage duration are related to different characteristics of the outages. The results of the models can be used as inputs to construct various scenarios to estimate potential outcomes of electric power outages, encompassing the risks, consequences, and costs of such outages.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk‐Management and Risk‐Analysis‐Based Decision Tools for Attacks on Electric Power

Simonoff¹,

Restrepo²,

Zimmerman³

2007

Risk Analysis

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Ezell et al (2010) review probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) and event tree analysis , often used together, as well as some of the controversies that have accompanied their use in terrorism applications (see, for example, Martz and Johnson, 1987 ; Smith Stegen et al Gleason, 1988 ). Aven and Renn (2009) stress the diffi culties in establishing reasonable probability estimates for events occurring.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Terrorists versus the Sun: Desertec in North Africa as a case study for assessing risks to energy infrastructure

2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

As renewable energies gain both in importance and in share of the global energy mix, questions arise as to whether they will face the same energy security challenges -such as terrorist attacks -that have confronted the oil and gas industry. This article addresses the risk of terrorism to the infrastructure associated with renewable energies and electrical power systems and transmission lines. It reviews the capacities of various risk assessment tools and analyzes the potential terrorist threat to the Desertec concept, which envisions meeting 15 per cent of Europe ' s electricity demand by 2050 with renewable energy sourced from the Middle East North Africa region. Some industry observers have already voiced grave concerns about potential European dependence on this region, specifically because of the presence of terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, which was responsible for the 2001 attacks in the United States. The data for the Desertec case study analysis are partly informed by a series of interviews conducted with correspondents located in Europe and in North Africa.

show abstract

“…For the two-device system depicted in Fig. 1, the Type I and 11 error probabilities for the Case 1 system are P(AD21NADl fl N T ) = P?hT + E &~~~~ Therefore, Similarly, ( 5 ) and (6) can be written as and respectively. 0 Corollary 1 gives expressions for the error probabilities in (3-6) that relate the dependent and independent systems, by quantifying the error introduced when device responses are incorrectly assumed to be independent.…”

Section: System Dependence In the Two-device Systemmentioning

confidence: 97%

Addressing the Dependency Problem in Access Security System Architecture Design

Kobza

Jacobson

1996

Risk Analysis

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The objective of this research is to present a method for evaluating the performance of access control security systems, such as airport security operations. This requires the examination of security system architectures, which involve security technology devices and the algorithms that coordinate their operations. Dependence between device responses in multiple-device systems is a critical practical issue in assessing the performance of such architectures, though no results on this problem have appeared in the literature. This paper presents a method for evaluating when multipledevice security systems with overlapping capabilities are cost-effective. This is achieved using a dependency structure for security system devices to quantify how various technologies interact and to measure the impact of device dependence on system error probabilities. A measure of device response dependence for a two-device system is defined and its properties are explored, including bounds on the dependency measure. The effect of dependence on the system Type I and Type I1 error probabilities is examined for the two-device system. System performance is compared for independent vs. dependent device responses and desirable dependence relationships are identified. Results are also presented for a cascading sequence of devices. An example is presented to illustrate the results for the two-device system. Implications of these results are discussed, such as how they can be used to identify the optimal use of security devices and to determine whether new technologies warrant investment. ~ _ _ _~~

show abstract

Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks

Cited by 26 publications

References 4 publications

Risk‐Management and Risk‐Analysis‐Based Decision Tools for Attacks on Electric Power

Risk‐Management and Risk‐Analysis‐Based Decision Tools for Attacks on Electric Power

Terrorists versus the Sun: Desertec in North Africa as a case study for assessing risks to energy infrastructure

Addressing the Dependency Problem in Access Security System Architecture Design

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About