Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure

Abstract

Why do majority parties choose to add extreme dead on arrival bills to their legislative agendas rather than enactable legislation? Majorities in Congress choose this strategy in order to accrue political support from their allied interest groups who reliably reward this legislative behavior. By examining all bills that receive floor consideration from 2003 through 2012, as well as interest group scorecards and campaign commercials, I find support for my theory. Dead‐on‐arrival bills generate electoral benefits for majority‐party lawmakers, are more politically valuable than other bills, and are more often used to credit rather than punish legislators.

Unilateral Inaction: Congressional Gridlock, Interbranch Conflict, and Public Evaluations of Executive Power

“…They may even suffer for it. Just as members of Congress may reap electoral benefits from considering infeasible legislation (Gelman 2017) or forcing the president to veto popular veto legislation (Groseclose and McCarty 2001), legislative gridlock in a given policy domain may tempt presidents into exercising unilateral powers that undercut their public standing.…”

“…Addressing this question is essential, however, for understanding presidents’ incentives for using unilateral power when congressional gridlock makes legislative action unlikely, a context increasingly familiar for recent presidents. Just as Congress may accrue electoral benefits from passing “dead‐on‐arrival” bills (Gelman 2017) and can force presidents to veto popular policies (Groseclose and McCarty 2001), presidential approval may be affected by the president's decision to accept the status quo or act unilaterally when faced with congressional inaction.…”

Do Lawmakers Respond to Crisis Ideologically or Pragmatically?

“…Most research on bill sponsorship and cosponsorship focuses on lawmakers’ issue priorities rather than the policy instruments in the bills they support. Issue agendas are explained by lawmakers’ personal backgrounds and interests (Burden, 2007; Carnes, 2013; Choi, 2015; Swers, 2020; Tate, 2004), partisanship (Petrocik, 1996; Petrocik et al, 2003), interest groups (Gelman, 2017; Hall & Wayman, 1990; Rocca & Gordon, 2010), the president’s agenda if they are of the same party (Hall, 1998; Kingdon, 1989), and perceptions of constituency needs (Hall, 1998; Hayes et al, 2010; Miler, 2010; Sulkin, 2005). which can be revealed by challengers’ campaigns (Hall, 1998; Miler, 2010; Sulkin, 2005, 2011), and protests (Gause, 2020).…”

If Congress Is So Dysfunctional, Why Is Its Staff So Busy? A Congressional Fellow’s Perspective

“…Lee (2016) argues that in unified government, the minority party relies on messaging strategies as a way to force the majority party to take unpopular positions and tarnish their reputation. Additionally, research I have conducted indicates that messaging is used to generate political support from a party’s allied interest groups (Gelman 2017).…”