Revisiting Deep Disagreement

Abstract

Argument-giving reasons for a view-is our model of rational dispute resolution. Fogelin (1985) suggests that certain "deep" disagreements cannot be resolved in this way because features of their context "undercut the conditions essential to arguing" (p. 5). In this paper we add some detail to Fogelin's treatment of intractable disagreements. In doing so we distinguish between his relatively modest claim that some disputes cannot be resolved through argument and his more radical claim that such disputes are beyond rational resolution. This distinction, along with some ofthe detail we add to Fogelin's treatment, sheds some useful light on the project of informal logic.Resume: L'argumentation-Ia proposition de raisons pour soutenir un jugement-est notre modele de resolution de desaccord. Fogelin (1985) suggere que certains des accords «pro fonds» ne peuvent pas se n:soudre par I' argu-mentation parce que des aspects d'un contexte de contestation «etouffent les conditions necessaires de I'argumentation» (p. 5). Dans cet article no us ajoutons des details a I'approche de Fogelin sur les des accords difficiles a resoudre. Nous distinguons son opinIOn relativement modeste que I 'argumentation ne peut pas Tt:soudre certains des accords et son opinion plus radicale que de tels des accords son! au-dela de resolutions rationnelles. Cette distinction ainsi que d'autres informations sur I'approche de Fogelin eclairent d'avantage Ie projet de la logique non formelle.

Investigating the Shared Background Required for Argument: A Critique of Fogelin’s Thesis on Deep Disagreement

“…While admitting that such an exchange might be complicated by some initial disagreement, they insist that people who share most of the beliefs relevant to the topic at hand will know how to settle the matter through further reasoning. Turner and Wright's (2005) belief that these scenarios represent a paradigm of productive argument is clear when they later refer to "those quotidian uses of argument form that establish our expectations of it," and when they compare philosophical arguments to "a 'normal' episode in which a reason simply ends a debate by appeal to a shared competence" (p. 31).…”

“…Yet who could possibly declare themselves to be a truly competent judge of ethics? With respect to these sorts of arguments, Turner and Wright (2005) suggest: "their interminability among uncontroversially informed and intelligent people makes it fairly clear that they lie at the outer edge of our competence and understanding" (p. 31). Campolo (2005) adds, "our joint reasoning in such cases cannot be better than our joint competence-and that is quite low" (p. 44).…”

“…At this point I should note that Turner and Wright and Campolo's conceptions of deep disagreement vary somewhat from Fogelin's. Turner and Wright (2005) portray the distinction between normal (productive) arguments and deep disagreements as one between giving reasons against "a stable background of understanding and competence" versus altering the background itself (p. 31) 1 . For them, reasoning about background beliefs is merely the activity that makes productive argument possible.…”

Argumentation, rationality, and psychology of reasoning

“…), reasoning is a normative, rule-governed activity (cf. Campolo 2005;Melser 2004;Laden 2012;Turner and Wright 2005) rather than a psy-chological process. This activity consists in an expression of a thinker's reasons which commits her to them, rather than a report of those reasons.…”

Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology

“…This view has been recently considered byFogelin (2005),Feldman (2005),Hazlett (2013),Lynch (2016), andPritchard (2011b). See alsoAdams (2005),Campolo (2009),Phillips (2008), andTurner and Wright (2005).…”