Reverse-engineering censorship in China: Randomized experimentation and participant observation

Abstract

Existing research on the extensive Chinese censorship organization uses observational methods with well-known limitations. We conduct the first large-scale experimental study of censorship by creating accounts on numerous social media sites, randomly submitting different texts, and detecting from a worldwide network of computers which are censored. We also supplement the usual interviews with secret sources by creating our own social media site, contracting with Chinese firms to install the same censoring technologies as existing sites, and -with their software, documentation, and even customer support -reverse engineering how it all works. Our results offer rigorous support for the recent hypothesis that criticism of the state, its leaders, and their policies are published, whereas posts about real world events with collective action potential are censored.

The evolution of the Internet: from military experiment to General Purpose Technology

“…To a certain extent, this has already happened -for example, in China, which is now the largest Internet market in the world but where the government retains very tight and sophisticated control over the network (see e.g. King, Pan, and Roberts 2014). Other governments -notably those of Iran, the Russian Federation and some MiddleEastern regimes -have also instituted increasingly tight control over use of the Internet by their citizens.…”

Attitudes Toward Local and National Government Expressed over Chinese Social Media: A Case Study of Food Safety

“…It is possible but unlikely that Weibo posts about the national government were censored. First, posts about food safety, in this instance, are unlikely to involve calls for collective action or public protest, which constitute the vast majority of censored posts (see King, Pan, andRoberts, 2013 and. Second, posts about food safety are unlikely to contain terms that would be censored immediately, based on keyword filters.…”

“…As a result, at the regime's behest, company-employed content censors quickly remove sensitive content. In general, posts about "realworld events with collective action potential" are far more likely to be censored than expressions of discontent, suggesting that authorities seek to prevent would-be protestors from organizing over social media but are willing to allow netizens to voice their dissatisfaction (King, Pan, and Roberts, 2014, p. 1; see also King, Pan, and Roberts, 2013). In 2012, in an effort to gain control over potential regime-threatening discussion on Sina Weibo, government officials enacted two new regulations: one required netizens to register with their real names when opening accounts, and the other required Sina Weibo to monitor the posts of high-profile bloggers with more than 100,000 followers and eliminate any questionable posts within a five-minute window after posting (Tkacheva et al, 2013).…”

“…At the time of data collection, DataSift did not have a way of ensuring that Weibo messages are captured before any such removals. However, given that the discussion surrounding food safety on microblogging platforms in the wake of the Husi scandal was unlikely to contain many posts with collective action potential and more likely to consist of individual responses commenting on the event, this data collection method should have captured most of the Weibo posts made on the subject of food safety (see King, Pan, andRoberts, 2013, andKing, Pan, andRoberts, 2014).…”

“We need more clips about Putin, and lots of them:” Russia's state-commissioned online visual culture

“…In this respect, our study also positions itself within the growing literature on "networked authoritarianism," 5 which focuses on how repressive states are appropriating and adapting online technologies to serve new ends (MacKinnon 2012;King, Pan, and Roberts 2014). Authoritarian regimes have embraced new technology: analysis conducted by Rød and Weidmann (2015, 2) shows a positive correlation between authoritarianism, and a state's willingness to "support the internet."…”