Reverse auctions and buyer–seller relationships: A rejoinder to Emiliani and Stec's commentary

The Use of Procedural Fairness in Electronic Reverse Auctions to Enhance Relationship Quality

“…First, it adds to the relationship marketing literature by examining the role of procedural fairness in enhancing relationship quality and quality of the offering in ERAs for a buying organization. This study illustrates that a “relational auction is not an oxymoron” (Daly & Nath, , p. 173) and points to the importance of procedural fairness in relationship marketing for influencing quality outcomes. Second, it offers empirical support through a global field study involving 179 buying professionals, as well as exploratory insight through a supporting field study with 31 sales professionals at supplier organizations, showing that the use of procedural fairness by a buying organization is positively associated with quality outcomes in ERA use, without jeopardizing price savings.…”

“…In addition, prior exploratory research has proposed procedural fairness as an influencing factor in ERAs (Daly & Nath, ; Tunca, Wu, & Zhong, ). Charki et al.…”

“…Prior research focusing on preserving relationship quality in ERA use has been sparse. Daly and Nath (,b) propose several principles that can be used to render ERAs more relationship friendly. However, these principles involve price concessions, which are generally deemed inacceptable for buying organizations that conduct ERAs as a means to save money (Emiliani & Stec, ).…”

An empirical study of electronic reverse auction project outcomes

“…Prior research studies have identified procedural fairness as an important issue in ERAs (Amelinckx et al 2008, Daly and Nath 2005a, Tunca et al 2013) and examining its role is promising, as it has been shown to be important in studies of other inter-firm relationship settings (Kumar et al 1995, Luo 2008. Kumar et al (1995) found that procedural fairness enhances relationship quality between relatively smaller, vulnerable resellers and larger, powerful suppliers.…”

Why don't buyers like electronic reverse auctions? Some insights from a French study

“…The debate between Emiliani and Stec (2005), and Daly and Nath (2005b) on the research journal Industrial Marketing Management reflects this divergence of opinion.…”