Rethinking actions: implementation and association

Abstract

Action processing allows us to move through and interact with the world, as well as understand the movements performed by other people. In recent years, there has been increasing interest in the semantics of actions as differentiated from the semantics of objects. However, as the understanding of action semantics has evolved, it is evident that the existing literature conflates two senses of the word “action”—one that stems from studies of tool use and the other from event representation. In this paper, we suggest that this issue can be clarified by closely examining differences in how the human parietal and temporal cortices of the brain process action-related stimuli. By contrasting the posterior parietal cortex to the posterolateral temporal cortex, we characterize two complementary action systems in the human brain, each with its own specialization of function. We suggest that these two systems be referred to as the parietal Action Implementation System, and the posterolateral temporal Action Association System. While the fronto-parietal system is concerned primarily with how we perform actions, and simulate others’ actions, the temporal action system is more involved with processing actions from a third-person, conceptual standpoint. Recent work in cognitive neuroscience of perception and language, as well as the neuroanatomical organization of these brain regions support this distinction. We will discuss the implications of this work for cognition-, language-, and neuroscience-based action research.

Thematic knowledge, artifact concepts, and the left posterior temporal lobe: Where action and object semantics converge

“…These findings suggest that thematic relations for artifacts convey visual motion information typically associated with artifact-related actions. This interpretation is consistent with a recent view of action representations in terms of complementary implementation and association systems (Quandt & Chatterjee, 2015). Whereas the frontoparietal system may be specialized for the production and simulation of actions from an egocentric perspective, the posterolateral temporal system may process actions from a third-person perspective, which would explain the important involvement of the visual modality during the perception of artifact-related actions and during the reconstruction of action events in which thematically-related objects participate.…”

“…The left posterior temporal cortex is associated with both manipulable artifact concepts (Beauchamp & Martin, 2007; Campanella, D’Agostini, Skrap, & Shallice, 2010; Chao, Weisberg, & Martin, 2002; Devlin et al, 2002; Martin, Kyle Simmons, Beauchamp, & Gotts, 2014; Noppeney, 2008) and artifact action knowledge (Andres, Pelgrims, & Olivier, 2013; Kalénine et al, 2010; Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2003; Noppeney, 2008; Perini, Caramazza, & Peelen, 2014; Quandt & Chatterjee, 2015; Schubotz, Wurm, Wittmann, & von Cramon, 2014; Tarhan et al, 2015; Tyler et al, 2003). The present findings suggest that understanding the semantic relation between an artifact (manipulable or not) and other objects and agents participating in the same event necessitates access to representation of the actions that are typically associated with the artifact, an ability that requires the integrity of the left posterior temporal cortex.…”

Neural bases of action abstraction

“…For instance, processing a stimulus referring to boxing might call upon semantically-related concepts, such as fighting or punching . These two kinds of action knowledge have their own neural signatures (Quandt & Chatterjee, 2015). We consider each possibility as it relates to our findings and propose that both kinds of processing occur when processing the concept of an action that is independent of the form of its presentation.…”

“…Actions can be understood in terms of how the observer would herself carry out the action. Such “action implementation” (Quandt & Chatterjee, 2015) is largely reliant on dorsal streams, including frontal and parietal regions such as the premotor cortex (Michael et al, 2014), primary sensorimotor cortices, and the posterior parietal lobe. From the action simulation viewpoint, the regions of the brain involved in understanding actions are the same neural circuits that instantiate the motor and sensory features of actions (Avenanti, Candidi, & Urgesi, 2013).…”

“…We designed a functional neuroimaging study in which we showed participants schematic action images and corresponding verbs. We then conducted a representational similarity analysis (Kriegeskorte, Mur, & Bandettini, 2008) in order to test the hypothesis that format-independent action processing would evoke neural activity in brain regions devoted to motor and sensory simulation of these actions as well as brain regions implicated in associative processes (Quandt & Chatterjee, 2015). …”