Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme

Watson, Gary

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.003.0009

Cited by 83 publications

(69 citation statements)

References 78 publications

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“…Driver flags a footnote of mine (C&R: 176, n. 1) in which I put pressure on Scanlon on just this issue. Scanlon (2008: 233-4, n. 54) criticizes Watson (1987) for understanding blame itself as incipiently a form of communication. According to Scanlon, expressions of blame are forms of communication, but blame itself is not.…”

Section: Driver On Private Blamementioning

confidence: 99%

Quality of Will, Private Blame and Conversation: Reply to Driver, Shoemaker, and Vargas

McKenna

2016

Criminal Law, Philosophy

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In this paper, I defend my book Conversation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2012) in response to three critics: Julia Driver, David Shoemaker, and Manuel Vargas. Driver raises questions about my account of private blame. Shoemaker finds problems with my account of quality of will. And Vargas questions the conversational nature of my account. Keywords Moral responsibility Á Conversational theory Á Quality of will Á Blame Á Private blame Á Capacities for being responsible Á Capacities for holding responsible I am honored that my book Conversation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2012) is the subject of such excellent critical attention. I would like to begin by thanking Julia Driver, David Shoemaker, and Manuel Vargas for their challenging papers. 1 Each pushes me to develop my views further.

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Section: Driver On Private Blamementioning

confidence: 99%

Quality of Will, Private Blame and Conversation: Reply to Driver, Shoemaker, and Vargas

McKenna

2016

Criminal Law, Philosophy

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“…It would make no sense to ask him to defend it, because he himself regards it as completely puzzling and unintelligible whenever it occurs. 27 Watson (1993) devotes an extended discussion to this case in his thought-provoking article ''Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme.'' I am much indebted to his discussion.…”

Section: Bad Agents and Blameworthy Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Control, responsibility, and moral assessment

Smith

2006

Philos Stud

175

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“…For additional characterizations of the moral community as a conversation see, GaryWatson (1987) and Michael McKenna (2012).6 In a conversation there are a variety of appropriate responses in a given context. Once can declare, inquire, exclaim, and so on.…”

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confidence: 99%

Moral Innocence as Illusion and Inability

Goldberg

2015

Philosophia

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The concept of moral innocence is frequently referenced in popular culture, ordinary language, literature, religious doctrine, and psychology. The morally innocent are often thought to be morally pure, incapable of wrongdoing, ignorant of morality, resistant to sin, or even saintly. In spite of, or perhaps because of this frequency of use the characterization of moral innocence continues to have varying connotations. As a result, the concept is often used without sufficient heed given to some of its most salient attributes, especially those germane to moral agency and the moral community. In this article I intend to identify these attributes and propose that moral innocence is best defined as an inability to enter the moral community as a result of a trust in moral illusions. The content of the illusions pertains to several factors including one's role(s) in the moral community, one's ability to wrong or harm others, the intricacies of one's moral interaction with others, and the corresponding manifold complexities tangled up with the concepts of good and evil. Maintaining these illusions impedes or even prohibits an appropriate exchange of praise and blame with others. As membership in the moral community requires precisely this ability to engage in such an exchange, moral illusions necessarily give rise to an inability to participate in the moral community.Keywords Moral innocence . Moral community . Moral illusion . Moral imagination . Moral agency . ResponsibilityThe concept of moral innocence is frequently referenced in popular culture, ordinary language, literature, religious doctrine, and psychology. 1 The morally innocent are often thought to be morally pure, incapable of wrongdoing, ignorant of morality, resistant to sin, or even saintly. In many literary and religious contexts, moral innocence is associated with sexual innocence and is considered an attribute that an individual should try not to lose, or should try and regain. In spite of, or perhaps because of this Philosophia

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Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme

Cited by 83 publications

References 78 publications

Quality of Will, Private Blame and Conversation: Reply to Driver, Shoemaker, and Vargas

Quality of Will, Private Blame and Conversation: Reply to Driver, Shoemaker, and Vargas

Control, responsibility, and moral assessment

Moral Innocence as Illusion and Inability

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