Quality of Will, Private Blame and Conversation: Reply to Driver, Shoemaker, and Vargas

Abstract

In this paper, I defend my book Conversation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2012) in response to three critics: Julia Driver, David Shoemaker, and Manuel Vargas. Driver raises questions about my account of private blame. Shoemaker finds problems with my account of quality of will. And Vargas questions the conversational nature of my account. Keywords Moral responsibility Á Conversational theory Á Quality of will Á Blame Á Private blame Á Capacities for being responsible Á Capacities for holding responsible I am honored that my book Conversation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2012) is the subject of such excellent critical attention. I would like to begin by thanking Julia Driver, David Shoemaker, and Manuel Vargas for their challenging papers. 1 Each pushes me to develop my views further.

The Communication Argument and the Pluralist Challenge

“…According to Watson, blame involves a concern for the basic demand, which is "a moral demand, a demand for reasonable regard" (2004,229). Watson seems to imply that blame, or at least the most appropriate and direct form of blame, is both meant to convey a moral demand as its content (the blamer is meant to communicate that she demands a reasonable degree of good will), and also meant to be in the form of a demand itself (her blaming attitude or behavior constitutes a demand itself, instead of 1 McKenna (2012McKenna ( , 2016 argues that public blame is more explanatorily basic. By contrast, Driver (2016) and Menges (2017) have provided reasons for thinking private blame is more explanatorily basic.…”

“…McKenna (2012McKenna ( , 2016 argues that public blame is more explanatorily basic. By contrast,Driver (2016) and Menges (2017) have provided reasons for thinking private blame is more explanatorily basic.2 For different accounts see, e.g.,Watson (2004),Sher (2005), andScanlon (2008).Canadian Journal of Philosophy 385…”