Resolving Canada-US Trade Disputes in Agriculture and Forestry: Lessons from Lumber

Biggs, Jeffrey; Laaksonen-Craig, Susanna; Niquidet, Kurt; Kooten, G. Cornelis van

doi:10.2307/4128725

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 12 publications

(10 reference statements)

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“…First, trade disputes are more common within the agricultural sector compared to the non‐agricultural sector (Santana & Jackson, 2012). Prominent trade disputes between the United States and Canada have been within the agri‐food and forestry sectors (Biggs et al., 2006). For example, WTO trade disputes on softwood lumber, hard wheat and durum, and the compulsory country‐of‐origin labeling (COOL) requirement were all within the agricultural sector.…”

Section: Does Politics Matter For Agri‐food Trade?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Role of international politics on agri‐food trade: Evidence from US–Canada bilateral relations

Afesorgbor

Beaulieu

2021

Canadian J Agri Economics

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A well‐functioning trade relationship between Canada and the United States is crucial to the economic vitality of the Canadian agri‐food industry. However, agri‐food trade is more susceptible than other sectors to political interventions. The Trump presidency has strained Canada–US relations and his trade policy actions have significantly increased trade restrictions and trade policy uncertainty and undermined the rules‐based global trading system. We examine the pattern of agri‐food trade between the two countries and find that the upward trajectory of bilateral agri‐food trade ended in 2013. Although this flatlining predates the Trump administration, we show that Trump increased trade policy uncertainty starting in 2017 and likely impacted further expansion of trade. We examine what might change under the Biden presidency and argue that the new administration is likely to restore strong relationships with allies and work to rebuild important international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although protectionist forces will continue to impact bilateral agri‐food trade, we expect closer political ties between a Biden administration and the Canadian Prime Minister. This should have a positive effect on the Canadian agri‐food industry by reducing trade uncertainties, thereby increasing agri‐food trade between Canada and the United States.

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Section: Does Politics Matter For Agri‐food Trade?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Role of international politics on agri‐food trade: Evidence from US–Canada bilateral relations

Afesorgbor

Beaulieu

2021

Canadian J Agri Economics

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“…Around the time the negotiations were halted, the WTO AB circulated its ruling on two different disputes that largely upheld the findings of the original panels 19 . In response, the US attempted to satisfy its trade partner by revising the USDOC calculations and lowering the CVD duties to around 13%, bringing the combined duties down to roughly 20% (Briggs et al ., 2005), which it said brought its softwood import regime into compliance. Canada heavily disagreed and subsequently asked a compliance panel to rule on the USDOC's revision.…”

Section: The Us's Delayed Compliance Despite a Simple Form Of Implemementioning

confidence: 99%

Firms’ Integration into Value Chains and Compliance with Adverse WTO Panel Rulings

Yildirim

2017

World Trade Review

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This article aims to account for the variation in the time it takes for WTO Members to bring compliance following adverse panel rulings. It seeks to answer the question: under what conditions do defendants swiftly implement adverse rulings of WTO panels? I demonstrate that defendants are more likely to comply without delay when the targeted measures involve firms that are integrated into regional and global value chains. When a dispute touches upon the interests of these firms and targets import-restricting measures, they are triggered to mobilize and press for compliance because they rely on foreign imports. In effect, the mobilization of these firms changes the domestic political conditions in favor of timely implementation. I show the plausibility of my argument in a comparative design with four case studies in which the US and Canada acted as defendants in WTO disputes. I control for a number of political factors and also consider legal sources of variation – i.e. the complexity of the form of implementation – that may impact WTO Members’ record of compliance.

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“…Nilai tegakan dari lelang tegakan tetap dianggap sebagai ukuran kelangkaan yang lebih baik dibandingkan dengan nilai tegakan yang diturunkan dari harga kayu bulat atau dari harga produk lainnya yang terbuat dari kayu (Brown & Field 1978). Stumpage price pernah menyebabkan perselisihan yang memakan waktu panjang antara Amerika Serikat dan Kanada dalam hal perdagangan softwood (Boyd & Krutilla 1987;Gagné 2003;Biggs et al 2006;Carmody 2006). Kanada dituduh menerapkan subsidi terselubung pada harga kayu softwood yang diekspor ke Amerika Serikat.…”

Section: Teori Ekonomi Sumber Dayaunclassified

Types of Forestry Charges from Natural Resource Economics Perspective

Soedomo

2012

jtfm

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Capturing economic rent from natural resources, particularly forests, frequently still creates disagreement between the government and businesses. The charges imposed by the government in the forms of reboisation fund (DR) and forest resource provision (PSDH) have been in place for very long time, accepted by all stakeholders, and supported by laws. Government policy regarding compensation for forest stand value (GRNT) creates controvercies. This paper intends to clarify problem of forest charges by returning it to its fundamental theories, e.g. economic theory of natural resouces. Economic rent of forests that are controlled by the government is the right of all Indonesia people. Henece, the government has responsibility for capturing the rent as much as possible in the most efficient way. If the stumpage is too low then it potentially promotes overcutting, whereas if it is too high then it makes forest business less attractive that potentially promotes illegal activities. In forestry, economic rent of forest has a special name, it is stumpage price. There are some difficulties in estimating a competitive stumpage price, wheter the one obtained through a direct competitive auction of standing timber or through calculation of residual price. Partly, the difficulties were generated by the government's own policies that strongly distorted log prices. Log export ban and vertical integration are the two most influential policies in distorting log prices. Actually, the government is able to design and implement a single charge to capture PSDH, DR, and GRNT so that their administration becomes much simpler and more efficient.

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Resolving Canada-US Trade Disputes in Agriculture and Forestry: Lessons from Lumber

Cited by 4 publications

References 12 publications

Role of international politics on agri‐food trade: Evidence from US–Canada bilateral relations

Role of international politics on agri‐food trade: Evidence from US–Canada bilateral relations

Firms’ Integration into Value Chains and Compliance with Adverse WTO Panel Rulings

Types of Forestry Charges from Natural Resource Economics Perspective

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