Resilience of public transport networks against attacks

Abstract

The behavior of complex networks under failure or attack depends strongly on the specific scenario. Of special interest are scale-free networks, which are usually seen as robust under random failure but appear to be especially vulnerable to targeted attacks. In recent studies of public transport networks of fourteen major cities of the world it was shown that these systems when represented by appropriate graphs may exhibit scale-free behavior [C. von Ferber et al., Physica A 380, 585 (2007), Eur. Phys. J. B 68, 261 (2009)]. Our present analysis, focuses on the effects that defunct or removed nodes have on the properties of public transport networks. Simulating different directed attack strategies, we derive vulnerability criteria that result in minimal strategies with high impact on these systems.PACS. 02.50.-r Probability theory, stochastic processes, and statistics -07.05.Rm Data presentation and visualization: algorithms and implementation -89.75.Hc Networks and genealogical trees

Urban Resilience: A Civil Engineering Perspective

“…Besides, many authors modelled engineering systems as planar graphs and assessed them only according to robust mathematical models [42,44]. Hence, the assessment of the generic network's robustness and connectivity is valuable from a strictly mathematical point of view.…”

“…Berche et al [44] analysed the resilience of public transportations networks (PTN) under different attack scenarios. Authors mapped the PTN as graphs.…”

“…Nonetheless, this approach is used in many studies, having a good potential of applicability to different problem's typologies. This is the case of Dorbritz [48] that combines the approach of Bruneau et al [3], with the network analysis suggested by Berche et al [44] for quantifying resilience. Consequences of node removals in transportation networks are modelled according to a topological and operational perspective.…”

Studying the Topology of Transportation Systems through Complex Networks: Handle with Care

“…For few studies, the authors do not reveal which kind of targeted attack they use: "We have simulated an attack on every network in our database by blocking travel through targeted stations" [83]. There are only a few notable exceptions, which correctly use interactive betweenness as a reference for network disruption simulation, e.g., [84][85][86][87]. Papers published in transportation journals rarely consider advanced network dismantling methods, emerging throughout the last 2-3 years.…”

Toward quantifying metrics for rail-system resilience: identification and analysis of performance weak resilience signals

“…However, without a clear understanding of what manifestations of resilience look like (Back et al 2008), it will be difficult to identify such manifestations in practice and quantify the theoretical models developed, creating a research-practice gap (Underwood and Waterson 2013). This is especially true when focusing on quantifying resilience for infrastructural systems, in which the current quantification methods used (e.g., graph theory: Berche et al 2009; fuzzy interference: Heaslip et al 2010) emanate from other well-established and well-elaborated methodological frameworks but as such are not fully capable of capturing the underlying interrelations of system modules (Tamvakis and Xenidis 2013). Research aimed at operationalizing theoretical resilience models and prospective analysis frameworks for quantifying resilience of infrastructure systems is required (e.g., Madni and Jackson 2009).…”