Research on the Incentive Mechanism of the Pension Service Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

Abstract

The information asymmetry between the pension service integrator and the pension service providers will affect the efficiency of the whole supply chain, and information sharing can solve this problem to a certain extent. To achieve information sharing, mutual trust is the first condition and mutual trust is also one of the important means of endogenous incentives. In this paper, the trust incentive coefficient is embedded in the principal-agent model. Considering the service capability coefficient, the communication degree coefficient, and the information sharing degree coefficient of the pension service providers, the trust incentive model of the supply chain of the pension service is constructed, the model is solved, and the conclusion is drawn. Finally, the correctness of the conclusion is verified by the numerical simulation using SAS software. The final results show that, under the condition of information asymmetry, the trust incentive coefficient of the pension service integrator to the pension service providers is positively correlated with the effort coefficient, the service capability coefficient, the communication coefficient, and the information sharing degree coefficient of the pension service providers, while it is positively correlated with the effort cost coefficient, the output sharing coefficient, and the risk aversion coefficient of the pension service providers. The variance of number and external environmental variables is negatively correlated. This research has shown that the trust is a means of incentive for pension service providers to share information. This research has a certain practical significance for improving the service efficiency of the pension services supply chain and optimizing the level of pension services.

Evolution Mechanism of Public–Private Partnership Project Trust from the Perspective of the Supply Chain

“…Existing studies have primarily focused on the importance of trust in the cooperation between the government and social capital within PPP projects, with limited research on supply chain trust mainly centered around trust levels [56] and reward and punishment measures [57]. The impact of the moral hazard coefficient and information asymmetry coefficient on trust in cooperative relationships has not been adequately addressed [58].…”

The Development Strategy of Dual-Channel Supply Chain of Smart Elderly Care Service from the Perspective of Time Perception

“…For this research, many scholars have studied the coordination and optimization of supply chains including elderly service providers and elderly service integrators from multiple perspectives. For example, Chen is based on the perspective of information incentive mechanism [7], Ma et al [8] and Zhao [9] are based on the perspective of contract mechanisms such as revenue sharing and punishment contracts, and Zhang et al [10] are based on the perspective of government incentives. Among them, service quality [9,11], medical services [12], and nursing staf scheduling [13] are the focus of research on the supply chain of elderly care services.…”

“…In the no-contract decision model, we count the frst partial derivatives of p r , s r , p e , and s e as formulas (7) and (8) according to the backward induction method. Combined with (zM r /zp r ) � 0, (zM r /zs r ) � 0, (zM e /zp e ) � 0, (zM e /zs e ) � 0, the optimal service price and the optimal service level of the online service channels and the ofine service channels of elderly care service integrator are obtained, as shown in the following formulas:…”