Research on secure control and communication for cyber-physical systems under cyber-attacks

Abstract

This paper investigates the co-design problem of secure control and communication quality for cyber-physical systems (CPSs) to solve unavoidable problems, in which both actuator faults and cyber-attacks occur in practical implementations of CPSs. Firstly, based on the discrete event-triggered communication scheme (DETCS), a system framework for active fault-tolerant and passive attack-tolerant control is proposed. Then, a model of a closed-loop CPS is established that integrates a triggering condition, actuator faults and cyber-attacks into a single uniform framework. Secondly, using the partition and definition of different delay functions, the appropriate Lyapunov functions are constructed based on the time-delay system theory, and design methods for a robust observer with passive attack tolerance for estimation of the state and fault, and an active fault-tolerant and passive attack-tolerant controller are developed in terms of linear matrix inequality. In this way, the co-design goal involving active fault tolerant control, passive attack-tolerant control and the communication network is achieved. Finally, a simulation experiment of a quadruple-tank is carried out to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

Research on co-design of dual security control and communication for nonlinear CPS with actuator fault and FDI attacks

“…The reason is that the method in Li et al 38 regards FDI attacks on double-end network as types of special disturbances and suppresses them passively in a robust manner. The control strategy proposed in this paper is different; specifically, a highly targeted active compensation is made for the actuator FDI attack according to its estimation, and the passive attack tolerance method is used only for the sensor FDI attack.…”

“…In the following, the active-passive attack tolerance method proposed in this paper and the passive attack tolerance method in Li et al 38 (to tolerate FDI attacks on double-end network passively and actuator fault actively) are adopted. The output responses with these different attack-tolerance methods are presented in Figure 10(a) and (b).…”

A systematic review of cyber-resilience assessment frameworks

“…Embry Riddle Aeron Univ,US [71]; Tech Univ Danmark,DK [125] Architecture Adaptive base corrective signal Amirkabir Univ Tech,IR & Qatar Univ,QA & Georgia Inst Tech,US [27] Artificial Immune server Kanagawa Inst Tech,JP [18] Co-design Daegu Gyeongbuk Inst Sci Tech,KR [55] Discrete event triggered communication Lanzhou Univ Tech,US [83] Dist. Kalman Fusion Estimator City Univ Hong-Kong,CN & Nanyang Tech Univ,SG & Zhejiang Univ Tech,CN [61] Systems Design Carnagie Mellon Univ,US & Univ Virginia,US [11] Three-layered reference architecture Washington State Univ,US & MITRE Corp,US & Univ Texas,US [105] Variable structure system theory Commun Univ China,CN & Texas A&M Univ,US & Univ Toronto,CA [112] Game Theory…”

Active Fault‐Tolerant/Active Passive Intrusion‐Tolerant H∞ Cooperative Control of Discrete NCS under the Background of Big Data

“…Although many achievements have been made in fault tolerance and attack tolerance of NCS, most of them are limited to independent design. For NCS with actuator failure and network attack coexisting, the research on comprehensive security control of fault tolerance and intrusion tolerance is rarely involved, and only literature [14] and literature [15] can be consulted at present. However, in actual NCS, it is inevitable that faults and attacks occur simultaneously.…”