Research on co-design of dual security control and communication for nonlinear CPS with actuator fault and FDI attacks

Abstract

In this study, a co-design method of dual security control and communication is investigated for a nonlinear cyber–physical system (CPS) with an actuator fault and false data injection (FDI) attacks. First, under the discrete event trigger communication scheme, considering the different effects of actuator fault and FDI attacks on a double-end network, a dual security control strategy with active fault-tolerance and active–passive attack-tolerance is proposed. It can accommodate an actuator fault, actively compensate an actuator FDI attack, and passively resist a sensor FDI attack, respectively, thereby establishing a new dual security control framework with fault-tolerance and attack-tolerance. Moreover, the Takagi–Sugeno (T-S) fuzzy model for the nonlinear CPS is established under this framework. Second, by constructing an appropriate Lyapunov–Krasovskii functional and introducing the time-delay theory and the affine Bessel–Legendre inequality, lesser conservative design methods of a robust augmented observer for the estimation of the state, FDI attacks, and fault as well as a dual security controller are obtained. Finally, a classical quadruple-tank model is used to show the validity and feasibility of the proposed method.

Integrated Security Control for Nonlinear CPS with Actuator Fault and FDI Attack: An Active Attack-Tolerant Approach

“…As can be seen from Figure 1, the framework mainly includes a nonlinear con plant, intelligent sensing units (sensor, sampler, event generator), execution unit order hold, actuator), control units (observer, integrated security controller) and c nication networks. It should be emphasised that, in this paper, we assume that th corresponding FDI attacks on the communication networks at both ends of the con Different from reference [30,31], in this paper, in order to reduce the compu burden of the intelligent sensing unit, the observer in the original intelligent sens was moved to the control unit. The advantage of this layout is that it not only redu computational load of the intelligent sensing unit but also makes full use of the s computational capability of the control unit, especially the active attack tolerance s which can be used for both dual-ended FDI attacks, so that the attack tolerance ca of the system is further enhanced.…”

“…Different from reference [30,31], in this paper, in order to reduce the computational burden of the intelligent sensing unit, the observer in the original intelligent sensing unit was moved to the control unit. The advantage of this layout is that it not only reduces the computational load of the intelligent sensing unit but also makes full use of the stronger computational capability of the control unit, especially the active attack tolerance strategy, which can be used for both dual-ended FDI attacks, so that the attack tolerance capability of the system is further enhanced.…”

“…The output response curve of the system when the active attack and fault-tolerant control strategy of this paper is used is given in Figure 11. In order to show the superiority of the active attack-tolerant strategy, the output response curves of the system when using the method in [31] is given in Figure 12 with the same parameters as selected in this paper. The study in [31] still adopted active fault-tolerant control for faults but adopted an activepassive attack-tolerant strategy for FDI attacks (that is, active compensation for actuator FDI attacks and passive tolerance for sensor FDI attack).…”

“…In the existing literature, research on integrated security control for CPS faults coexisting with attacks has only reported some preliminary results [30][31][32][33][34]. In [30], the co-design problem of active fault tolerance/passive attack tolerance and communication was studied in a CPS under a discrete event-triggered communication scheme.…”

“…In [30], the co-design problem of active fault tolerance/passive attack tolerance and communication was studied in a CPS under a discrete event-triggered communication scheme. Based on this, in [31], an active-passive attack-tolerant control strategy was proposed for actuator FDI attack active compensation combined with sensor FDI attack passive robustness. This is a previous research study by the current authors.…”