Research on product quality control in Chinese online shopping: based on the uncertainty mitigating factors of product quality

Li, Bo; Wen, Decheng; Shi, Xiaodan

doi:10.1080/14783363.2013.865917

Cited by 16 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 25 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Moreover, shopping-service sustainability also affects the customers' overall satisfaction. Except for environment-friendly products [37], customers also expect online sellers to provide green product delivery, the authentic exhibition of offerings on their websites, and recycled packing materials [38][39][40]. Enhanced service sustainability also leads to higher customer satisfaction [41].…”

Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceived Sustainability and Customer Engagement in the Online Shopping Environment: The Rational and Emotional Perspectives

et al. 2020

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

As increasing numbers of customers pay attention to product and service sustainability when shopping online, more and more firms in the online market engage in promoting perceived sustainability to establish close customer relationships. Prior studies implied the effects of perceived sustainability on transactional customer relationships, however, the role of perceived sustainability in influencing nontransactional customer relationships has received little attention. Drawing on existing conceptual models, this study aimed at exploring the effects of perceived sustainability on rational and emotional customer engagement (CE) in the online shopping environment. The data were collected through a questionnaire survey in China. Using the partial least squares (PLS) approach-based structural equation modeling (SEM) method, the authors found that perceived sustainability positively affects the two CE orientations through influencing short- and long-term transactional attitudes (satisfaction and commitment). A strong interrelationship between rational and emotional CE was also found. This is the first study presenting empirical evidence of the effects of perceived sustainability on nontransactional customer relationships from the rational and emotional perspectives. It also provides critical implications for online sellers in designing engagement programs.

show abstract

Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceived Sustainability and Customer Engagement in the Online Shopping Environment: The Rational and Emotional Perspectives

et al. 2020

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…ε < − mF, and Figure 1(b) shows that y evolves to 0 more slowly than x when 2, the dynamic system of behaviour choices has an evolution stable point (1,1). at means the Platform will control the product quality and the Seller will provide the compliant products as time going on while satisfying the following conditions at the same time: ① the sum of βM 2 (the government's penalty for the Platform) and − (1/2)β(A p + μ 1 A s )σ 2 η (the Platform's risk gain with the strategy combination of (Control, Not compliance)) is bigger than C p (m) (the controlling cost of the Platform); ② the sum of mF (the Platform's penalty for the Seller), (1 − r)Δl (the difference of the Seller's gain from the total additional revenue), αM 1 (the government's penalty for the Seller), and − (1/2)α(A s + μ 2 A p )σ 2 ε (the Seller's risk gain with the strategy combination of (Not control, Compliance)) is bigger than ΔC s (the difference of the Seller's cost).…”

Section: Verification Of Evolutionary Stability Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…ere are only a few research studies discussing the product quality control of online shopping under the government supervision. To solve the quality issues in online shopping, Li et al [1] built the model of three-level product quality control of Chinese online shopping, clarifying the responsibilities of entities and emphasizing the role of government supervision. Fu [10] established the evolutionary game of the online shopping platform and seller with consideration of players' losses caused by government penalty.…”

Section: Online Shopping Quality Game Under the Government Supervisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In reality, however, the Seller and the Platform may not fulfil their quality responsibilities, causing quality risks of online shopping. Due to the hidden and virtual nature of online sellers, it is difficult for consumers to grasp the true quality of products before buying, which leads to adverse selection under information asymmetry eventually [1]. In order to mitigate the hazards of adverse selection, the consumers pin their hopes on online shopping platforms as quality intermediaries to help consumers identify quality information and avoid counterfeit and shoddy products.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Online Shopping Quality Control: The Roles of Risk Attitude and Government Supervision

et al. 2021

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The product quality issues of online shopping have not been effectively solved with the rapid development of electronic commerce in China. Faced with the quality issues of online shopping, the main entities, such as online platforms and online sellers, should cooperate to control and assure compliant quality. The adverse selection of buyers caused by information asymmetry and the moral hazard of sellers aggravated by bilateral markets make the quality management of online shopping have a high degree of uncertainty and complexity. This study constructs an evolutionary game model to discuss the dynamic process of the quality behaviours of members and analyse the key triggers of the evolutionary directions in online shopping. By using numerical simulation analysis, the influences of government supervision intensities on the evolution trend of members’ quality behaviours are analysed with various risk attitude combinations in various cases. The current research finds that (1) the decrease of the quality control cost and the increase of the government’s benchmark fine are conducive to increasing the platform’s controlling probability; (2) the decrease of the proportion of rent and the increase of sellers’ fraud cost and the government’s benchmark fines are conducive to increasing the seller’s compliance probability; (3) when both the platform and seller are unwilling to make efforts for quality assurance, risk-seeking members make the seller gradually choose to provide compliant products; and (4) when the members are all risk-seeking, strengthening government supervision will help promote the transition of members’ behavioural choices in a benign direction. This paper enriches the theoretical research studies on both online product quality control and government-led social governance system of quality. Suggestions for government supervision and e-commerce entities are also provided for quality assurance and improvement.

show abstract

“…The e-commerce platform plays the most important role and it is the key for the smooth operation of the three-level product quality control system. The e-commerce platform also controls and guides the seller's activities of mitigating product quality uncertainty and improves the quality of products [13]. However, government quality supervision department and e-commerce platforms will be affected by factors such as regulatory costs, penalties, profits, and awards when determining regulatory strategies [14].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Online shopping green product quality supervision strategy with consumer feedback and collusion behavior

Zhu

2020

PLoS ONE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

With the development of e-commerce, online shopping has become one of the most important consumer channels. However, the lack of government supervision, insufficient review of e-commerce platforms, illegal sales of online sellers and invalid consumer complaints have led to frequent green product quality problems during online shopping. Therefore, this paper considers that the online seller may be driven by interests, colluding with the e-commerce platform and selling low quality green product. At the same time, we introduce consumer feedback, and take the government supervision department, the online seller and the e-commerce platform as actors of the evolutionary game. In this paper, the evolutionary strategy choices of each actor were analyzed, and the influence of different factors on the evolutionary stability results was explored. Research indicates: firstly, consumer complaints play an indirect regulatory role for the online seller; secondly, the enhancement of the losssharing relationship between the online seller and the e-commerce platform can promote the legal operation of the two and prevent collusion; thirdly, the impact of consumer complaints on the choice of the e-commerce platform depends on the government supervision department's penalty for the e-commerce platform; finally, the e-commerce platform establishes a reasonable reward system, which can make up for the defects of the online seller using advanced technology to avoid punishment. Our paper uses Matlab 2017 for simulation analysis and provides effective advices on how to urge the government supervision department to effectively supervise, promote the e-commerce platform to enhance review, urge the online seller to legal sale, and encourage consumers to legally defend their rights.

show abstract

Research on product quality control in Chinese online shopping: based on the uncertainty mitigating factors of product quality

Cited by 16 publications

References 25 publications

Perceived Sustainability and Customer Engagement in the Online Shopping Environment: The Rational and Emotional Perspectives

Perceived Sustainability and Customer Engagement in the Online Shopping Environment: The Rational and Emotional Perspectives

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Online Shopping Quality Control: The Roles of Risk Attitude and Government Supervision

Online shopping green product quality supervision strategy with consumer feedback and collusion behavior

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About