Online shopping green product quality supervision strategy with consumer feedback and collusion behavior

Abstract

With the development of e-commerce, online shopping has become one of the most important consumer channels. However, the lack of government supervision, insufficient review of e-commerce platforms, illegal sales of online sellers and invalid consumer complaints have led to frequent green product quality problems during online shopping. Therefore, this paper considers that the online seller may be driven by interests, colluding with the e-commerce platform and selling low quality green product. At the same time, we introduce consumer feedback, and take the government supervision department, the online seller and the e-commerce platform as actors of the evolutionary game. In this paper, the evolutionary strategy choices of each actor were analyzed, and the influence of different factors on the evolutionary stability results was explored. Research indicates: firstly, consumer complaints play an indirect regulatory role for the online seller; secondly, the enhancement of the losssharing relationship between the online seller and the e-commerce platform can promote the legal operation of the two and prevent collusion; thirdly, the impact of consumer complaints on the choice of the e-commerce platform depends on the government supervision department's penalty for the e-commerce platform; finally, the e-commerce platform establishes a reasonable reward system, which can make up for the defects of the online seller using advanced technology to avoid punishment. Our paper uses Matlab 2017 for simulation analysis and provides effective advices on how to urge the government supervision department to effectively supervise, promote the e-commerce platform to enhance review, urge the online seller to legal sale, and encourage consumers to legally defend their rights.

An Evolutionary Game Model for Online Food Safety Governance Under Two Different Circumstances

“…This was different from the reality that the platform was directly responsible for managing the settled enterprises [33]. Secondly, although the government supervision was introduced into research studies, these studies assumed that when the government implemented supervision, it could discover the enterprises' illegal behavior, which was not consistent with reality [49,50]. In reality, even if the government earnestly fulfilled its regulatory duties, some illegal enterprises and platforms would inevitably be missed due to the limitation of government's regulatory resource.…”

“…For example, He and Zhu (2020) focused on the collusion behavior between online companies and platforms. Researchers found that enhancing the loss-sharing relationship between the online seller and the e-commerce platform can prevent collusion behavior [49]. built a supervision game model between the governmental quality supervision department and the online shopping platform.…”

“…However, we also found some limitations to these studies. Firstly, in the study of He and Zhu (2020), although researchers regarded the platform as one important participant, they did not give the platform sectors the supervision power and only divided the platforms' behavioral strategy selection into two strategies: colluding with enterprises or not colluding with enterprises [49]. This was different from the reality that the platform was directly responsible for managing the settled enterprises [33].…”

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Online Shopping Quality Control: The Roles of Risk Attitude and Government Supervision

“…Li et al [2] designed a quality game model between the online shopping platform and the government and explained the essential role of government supervision in online shopping quality assurance. He and Zhu [11] focused on the green product quality in online shopping and explored the impact of consumer feedback on the three-party quality evolutionary game of "online shopping platform-online seller-government 2 Complexity regulatory authority," and found that the government should encourage consumers to complain, improve the green product certification mechanism, and severely punish violations in the transaction process to control the green product quality of online shopping. He et al [12] analysed the impacts of quality dropping rate and products' deterioration rate on the company's delivery time decisions, pricing and inventory decisions in a dual-channel supply chain that combined online direct sale channel and traditional offline channel.…”

Impact of Outlining Factors Towards Online Green Products: An Empirical Investigation on Consumers’ Awareness

“…So, their purchasing behaviour shifts to eco-friendly goods, this leads to a change in the production process of the industry, compelling to adopt "Go Green Strategy" in all aspect of the business. He & Zhu (2020) investigated that minimizing the probability of low-quality green products offered by the e-marketer, encourage consumers gathering in quality observation work together, and nurture their consciousness of safeguarding. Mayank & Amit (2013) observed in their research that the consumers and manufacturers are deeply serious about the environment concerns and green products and practices.…”