Research on Logistics Service Supply Chain Information Sharing Mechanism in the Belt and Road Initiative

Abstract

In the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), demand in informatization and coordinated logistics services is playing increasing attention to the frequent international trade transactions. Several authors have proposed models about supply chain information sharing focused on product supply chain to analyze the factors affecting the level of corporate information sharing and the relationship between the level of information sharing and corporate performance, etc. However, little is available to study on the decision-making issues of corporate information sharing in the service supply chain. This paper aims to reveal the possible impact of the government's infrastructure construction investment and government incentives on the logistics service supply chain in the logistics service supply chain under this theme. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model to explore the dynamic selection process of corporate information co-strategy, the logistics service supply chain composed of functional logistics service provider (FLSP) and logistics service integrator (LSI) taked as the research object. Numerical experiments show that the additional revenue of information sharing, revenue distributing coefficient, information sharing risk coefficient and the speculative income coefficient are closely to the probability of gamers' choosing information sharing; moreover, investment in government infrastructure construction is conducive to improving the initial willingness of logistics companies to implement information sharing in which the government's incentives for corporate information sharing behavior are directly proportional to the probability of logistics companies choosing information sharing. We discuss the practical implications of the proposed model, and the wider implications for improving the level of international logistics cooperation and the high-quality development of logistics enterprise informatization under the BRI.

Research on Shared Logistics Decision Based on Evolutionary Game and Income Distribution

“…Regarding the last-mile delivery problem, Zhou et al [18] considered the cooperation between logistics service providers (LSPs) and property service companies (PSCs), and established a trilateral evolutionary game model between PSCs, LSPs, and customers to analyze the strategic choices and to explore the influencing factors on the tripartite strategy. Li et al [19] constructed an evolutionary game model to explore the dynamic selection process of enterprise information sharing strategies in logistics service supply chains with functional logistics service providers (FLSPs) and logistics service integrators (LSIs) as research objects. Some scholars have also focused on the role of the government in logistics cooperation.…”

Stochastic evolutionary game analysis of food cooperation among countries along the Belt and Road from the perspective of food security

“…A replicator equation defined by Taylor and Jonker for a single species plays an important role in game dynamics (Cressman and Tao, 2014), and the evolutionary game theory has produced yet another groundbreaking development. Evolutionary game theory is a tool to understand the interactions among decision-makers with rational and strategic thinking abilities (Zhang et al, 2020), and some scholars have made many efforts to use evolutionary game theory to study the cooperation of countries along the B&R. In the context of BRI, a dynamic choice of logistics service providers was explored using an evolutionary game model and logistic service integrators in the context of corporate information co-strategy (Li et al, 2020). Based on Li's study, Wang et al (2022) examined the interaction mechanism between the regulatory committees of upstream and downstream countries and how transboundary ecological compensation can be sustained.…”

“…The second is information-sharing cooperation, where both partners reach a friendly agreement on the project, agree to an alliance, and maintain good information interchange, without a clear sharing agreement and power and responsibility relationship, which is a weaker binding cooperation, such as enterprise alliance. Since there is a large gap between the two cooperating parties, the larger and more technically competent party leads the smaller and less technically competent party to cooperate in an information-sharing manner (Avalos, 2009;Li et al, 2020;Lin et al, 2020).…”

“…There is an information cost for each country in choosing a cooperation strategy, and cooperation costs a certain amount of money while bringing additional benefits to the country. The information cost of the large cereal country is M1 (Li et al, 2020), and the information cost of the small cereal country is M2, M1 > M2.…”

Research on the Incentive Mechanism of the Pension Service Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

“…Wang et al established a nonlinear mixed integer multiobjective optimization model for service providers selection and order assignment in mass customization logistics service mode and designed an improved genetic algorithm based on the multilayer coding technique to solve the model [27]. Li et al constructed an evolutionary game model to explore the dynamic selection process of enterprise information synergy strategy in logistics service supply chain [28]. Liu et al studied the impact of loss aversion preference on purchasing decision of service capacity with renewed demand in a logistics service supply chain consisting of a logistics service integrator and functional logistics service providers [29].…”