Representations without Rules

Horgan, Terry; Tienson, John

doi:10.5840/philtopics198917116

Cited by 60 publications

(15 citation statements)

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“…It is not my purpose here to rebut arguments to the effect that language and thought requires symbolic representation and rules (Fodor & McLaughlin, 1991;Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). Objections to this position have, by now, been explored well enough to cast serious doubt on the view that classicists run the only game in town (Bechtel, 1988;Chalmers, 1990a;Garson, 1994;Horgan & Tienson, 1989). My purpose instead is to add fuel to the debate by advancing new considerations drawn from dynamical systems theory that can undermine confidence in the classical approach to cognitive science.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 88%

Cognition poised at the edge of chaos: A complex alternative to a symbolic mind

Garson¹

1996

Philosophical Psychology

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This paper explores a line of argument against the classical paradigm in cognitive science that is based upon properties of non-linear dynamical systems, especially in their chaotic and near-chaotic behavior. Systems of this kind are capable of generating information-rich macro behavior that could be useful to cognition. I argue that a brain operating at the edge of chaos could generate high-complexity cognition in this way. If this hypothesis is correct, then the symbolic processing methodology in cognitive science faces serious obstacles. A symbolic description of the mind will be extremely difficult, and even if it is achieved to some approximation, there will still be reasons for rejecting the hypothesis that the brain is in fact a symbolic processor.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 88%

Cognition poised at the edge of chaos: A complex alternative to a symbolic mind

Garson¹

1996

Philosophical Psychology

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“…On the account given, realists need not accept all tenets of the symbolic processing account of cognition. For example, Horgan and Tienson (1989) hold that representations are causally e cacious even though they deny that mental processing conforms to strict rules. There could also be realists who deny that representations contain causally active syntactic structure as long as they believe that the representations themselves really govern cognition.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 97%

Making symbols matter: a new challenge to their causal efficacy

Garson¹

2002

Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligen

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This paper locates a conceptual di culty in the view that symbolic representations causally govern mental processing. The problem is to craft a clear divide between systems that are governed by and systems that are merely described by representations. It is argued that neither computational functionalists nor identity theorists can secure the distinction that is needed for de®ning a successful criterion for the presence of representations with causal powers. The conclusion is that until those who are committed to the symbolic processing model of the mind can produce a better empirical account of what they mean by the presence of causally active representations in the brain, their claims will be irrelevant to the conduct of cognitive science.

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“…Fodor [30] and others have emphasized the functionalist point that softness can result from malfunctions in the material and processes implementing mental phenomena. Horgan and Tienson [39,40] have emphasized the softness that results from the indeterminate results of competition among a potentially open-ended range of con icting desires. But what is most relevant here are speci cally those exceptions to the rule that re ect our ability to act appropriately in the face of an open-ended range of contextual contingencies.…”

Section: Life and Mindmentioning

confidence: 99%

Four Puzzles About Life

Bedau

1998

Artificial Life

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To surmount the notorious difficulties of defining life, we should evaluate theories of life not by whether they provide necessary and sufficient conditions for our current preconceptions about life but by how well they explain living phenomena and how satisfactorily they resolve puzzles about life. On these grounds, the theory of life as supple adaptation gets support from the natural and compelling way it resolves the following four puzzles: (a) How are different forms of life at different levels of the vital hierarchy related? (b) Is there a continuum between life and nonlife? (c) Does life essentially concern a living entity's material composition or its form? (d) Are life and mind intrinsically connected?

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Representations without Rules

Cited by 60 publications

References 0 publications

Cognition poised at the edge of chaos: A complex alternative to a symbolic mind

Cognition poised at the edge of chaos: A complex alternative to a symbolic mind

Making symbols matter: a new challenge to their causal efficacy

Four Puzzles About Life

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