Cognition poised at the edge of chaos: A complex alternative to a symbolic mind

Garson, James W.

doi:10.1080/09515089608573186

Cited by 18 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 41 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…These pOints were powerfully made in some pre-EM philosophical engagements with the new dynamical approaches to cognition, for example by Jeff Foss (1992) and James Garson (1996). Dan Sperber's "epidemiology of representations" also embraces "a rather heterogeneous ontology, in that psychological and ecological phenomena are mixed together" (Sperber 1996, p. 26). 16.…”

Section: Conclusion: a Note On Explanationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process

Sutton¹

2010

The Extended Mind

342

275

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

1 Exograms, Interdisciplinarity, and the Cognitive life of Things The Extended Mind HypothesisOn the extended mind hypothesis (EM),l many of our cognitive states and processes are hybrids, unevenly distributed across biological and nonbiological realms (Clark 1997;Clark and Chalmers 1998). In certain circumstances, things-artifacts, media, or technologies-can have a cognitive life, with histories often as idiosyncratic as those of the embodied brains with which they couple (Sutton 2002a(Sutton , 2008. The realm of the mental can spread across the physical, social, and cultural environments as well as bodies and brains. My independent aims in this chapter are: first, to describe two compatible but distinct movements or "waves" within the EM literature, arguing for the priority of the second wave (and gesturing briefly toward a third); and, second, to defend and illustrate the interdisciplinary implications of EM as best understood, specifically for historical disciplines, by sketching two case studies.EM, an offshoot of mainstream functionalist information-processing cognitive science, has been focused in particular on our abilities to hook up with what Merlin Donald calls "exograms" or external symbols, by analogy with the brain's memory traces or "engrams" (Donald 1991, pp. 308-333; 2001, pp. 305-315).2 These abilities allow us to create and support cognitive profiles quite unlike those of creatures restricted to the brain's biological memories or engrams alone. Among other typical features, Donald pOints out that exograms last longer than engrams, have greater capacity, are more easily transmissible across media and context, and can be retrieved and manipulated by a greater variety of means (1991, pp. 315-316): so our skilled use of such crafted aids changes both the locus of memory in general and the role of our biological 190 J. Sutton memory within the new larger systems (see also Rowlands 1999, pp. 129-147).As I'll argue, it's important not to overstate the differences between internal and external traces: the version of EM I'm developing here, following in particular in Andy Clark's wake, is aimed precisely at investigating a wide range of possibilities on these and other dimensions of variation. I distinguish two versions or "waves" of EM, differentiated partly by the way these dimensions are characterized. These waves are not ultimately incompatible, but they are distinct strands in the EM literature and within Clark's own work: as we'll see, he acknowledged "a potential tension" between them as long ago as 1998 (Clark 1998, p. 99; see section 4 below). Before introducing the two waves, let me reiterate the key commitment they share, tweaked and applied differently in each case. External symbol systems and other "cognitive artifacts" are not always simply commodities, for the use and profit of the active mind: rather, in certain circumstances, along with the brain and body that interact with them, they are (part of) the mind. For Clark, "it is our basic human nature to annex, exploit and incorporate n...

show abstract

Section: Conclusion: a Note On Explanationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process

Sutton¹

2010

The Extended Mind

342

275

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As for cognition, some cognitive scientists have addressed the problem of the complexity of human cognition as one that is best described in terms of systems poised at the edge of chaos (e.g., Garson 1996Garson , 1998. Here, we would like to go one step further.…”

Section: Spontaneous Activitymentioning

confidence: 98%

Chaos breeds autonomy: connectionist design between bias and baby-sitting

Leeuwen

2007

Cogn Process

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In connectionism and its offshoots, models acquire functionality through externally controlled learning schedules. This undermines the claim of these models to autonomy. Providing these models with intrinsic biases is not a solution, as it makes their function dependent on design assumptions. Between these two alternatives, there is room for approaches based on spontaneous self-organization. Structural reorganization in adaptation to spontaneous activity is a well-known phenomenon in neural development. It is proposed here as a way to prepare connectionist models for learning and enhance the autonomy of these models.

show abstract

“…Since this broad-brush defence on materialist grounds a number of more specific options have been proposed. Patricia Churchland (1986) argues for replacement by neuroscience, Ramsey et al (1990) for replacement by connectionism and James Garson (1996) for replacement by dynamical systems theory. In all cases, limited time is devoted to arguing for replacement.…”

Section: Eliminativismmentioning

confidence: 98%

Sellars on thoughts and beliefs

Parsell

2010

Phenom Cogn Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, I examine Wilfrid Sellars' famous Myth of Jones. I argue the myth provides an ontologically austere account of thoughts and beliefs that makes sense of the full range of our folk psychological abilities. Sellars' account draws on both Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ryle provides Sellars with the resources to make thoughts metaphysically respectable and Wittgenstein the resources to make beliefs rationally criticisable. By combining these insights into a single account, Sellars is able to see reasons as causes and, hence, to respect the full range of our folk psychological generalisations. This is achieved by modelling folk psychological practice on theoretical reasoning. But despite frequent misinterpretation, Sellars does not claim that thoughts and beliefs are theoretical concepts. Thus, folk psychological explanation is not theoretical, and hence, it is not replaceable by scientific theory. Hence, scientific concepts will not eliminate folk psychological concepts. Thus, Sellars avoids eliminativism.Keywords Sellars . Folk psychology . Belief . Thought . EliminativismHere, then, is the dénouement. I have suggested a number of times that although it would be most misleading to say that concepts pertaining to thinking are theoretical concepts, yet their status might be illuminated by means of the contrast between theoretical and non-theoretical discourse. …. For once our fictitious ancestor, Jones, has developed the theory that overt verbal behavior is the expression of thoughts, and taught his compatriots to make use of the theory in interpreting each other's behavior, it is but a short step to the use of this language in self-description. …. Our ancestors begin to speak of the privileged access each of us has to his own thoughts. What began as a language with a purely theoretical use has gained a reporting role.Sellars (1956, §59) Phenom Cogn Sci (2011) 10:261-275

show abstract

Cognition poised at the edge of chaos: A complex alternative to a symbolic mind

Cited by 18 publications

References 41 publications

Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process

Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process

Chaos breeds autonomy: connectionist design between bias and baby-sitting

Sellars on thoughts and beliefs

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About