Representational Kinds

Smortchkova, Joulia; Murez, Michael

doi:10.1093/oso/9780190686673.003.0008

Cited by 14 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…2d; ). These methods cluster around a common underlying representation, standardly taken to be a unified representational kind Green & Quilty-Dunn, 2021;Scholl & Leslie, 1999;Smortchkova & Murez, 2020). Object files are extremely well-studied, are generated by encapsulated perceptual processes (Mitroff, Scholl, & Wynn, 2005;Scholl, 2007) that operate prior to and independently of natural-language-guided cognition , and are widely believed to have some sort of compositional structure (minimally, object-property bindings), making them an excellent test case for LoTH.…”

Section: Object Filesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The computational and the representational language-of-thought hypotheses

Chalmers

2023

Behav Brain Sci

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There are two versions of the language-of-thought hypothesis (LOT): Representational LOT (roughly, structured representation), introduced by Ockham, and computational LOT (roughly, symbolic computation) introduced by Fodor. Like many others, I oppose the latter but not the former. Quilty-Dunn et al. defend representational LOT, but they do not defend the strong computational LOT thesis central to the classical-connectionist debate.

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Section: Object Filesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The computational and the representational language-of-thought hypotheses

Chalmers

2023

Behav Brain Sci

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“…The presence of a natural representational kind is suggested by such “characteristic psychological effects” (Smortchkova & Murez forthcoming; cp. Carey 2009), and the fact that they cluster together provides evidence for a single underlying representation.…”

Section: Three Models Of the Perceptual Reference‐attribution Relationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Object perception provides a useful case study in the interaction between perceptual attribution and perceptual reference. Perceptual object representations (“PORs”) constitute a natural representational kind (Smortchkova & Murez forthcoming) and have received intensive empirical study. PORs track individuals over time while simultaneously maintaining and updating property‐attributing elements (“attributives”).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference

Quilty‐Dunn

Green

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Perceptual representations pick out individuals and attribute properties to them. This paper considers the role of perceptual attribution in determining or guiding perceptual reference to objects. We consider three extant models of the relation between perceptual attribution and perceptual reference--all attribution guides reference, no attribution guides reference, or a privileged subset of attributions guides reference--and argue that empirical evidence undermines all three. We then defend a flexible-attributives model, on which the range of perceptual attributives used to guide reference shifts adaptively with context. This model underscores the remarkable and dynamic intelligence of our perceptual capacities. We elucidate implications of the model for the boundary between perception and propositional thought.

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“…According to widely accepted views, mental representations are internal brain states and mechanisms that drive flexible behaviors i.e., behaviors that cannot be explained in terms of stimulus-responses only. There is still no consensus however on how mental representations are grounded in the brain, and especially about the nature of the computation they involve ( Gallistel, 2017 ; Smortchkova et al, 2020 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grounding Mental Representations in a Virtual Multi-Level Functional Framework

Bonzon

2023

Journal of Cognition

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According to the associative theory of learning, reactive behaviors described by stimulus-response pairs result in the progressive wiring of a plastic brain. In contrast, flexible behaviors are supposedly driven by neurologically grounded mental states that involve computations on informational contents. These theories appear complementary, but are generally opposed to each other. The former is favored by neuro-scientists who explore the low-level biological processes supporting cognition, and the later by cognitive psychologists who look for higher-level structures. This situation can be clarified through an analysis that independently defines abstract neurological and informational functionalities, and then relate them through a virtual interface. This framework is validated through a modeling of the first stage of Piaget’s cognitive development theory, whose reported end experiments demonstrate the emergence of mental representations of object displacements. The neural correlates grounding this emergence are given in the isomorphic format of an associative memory . As a child’s exploration of the world progresses, his mental models will eventually include representations of space, time and causality. Only then epistemological concepts, such as beliefs , will give rise to higher level mental representations in a possibly richer propositional format. This raises the question of which additional neurological functionalities, if any, would be required in order to include these extensions into a comprehensive grounded model. We relay previously expressed views, which in summary hypothesize that the ability to learn has evolved from associative reflexes and memories , to suggest that the functionality of associative memories could well provide the sufficient means for grounding cognitive capacities.

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Representational Kinds

Cited by 14 publications

References 5 publications

The computational and the representational language-of-thought hypotheses

The computational and the representational language-of-thought hypotheses

Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference

Grounding Mental Representations in a Virtual Multi-Level Functional Framework

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